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ABSTRACT
In today’s network, various stand-alone security services and/or proxies are used to provide
different security services. These individual security systems implementing one single security
function cannot address security needs o f evolving networks that require secure protocol such
as IPSec.

In this paper, we provide a framework for implementing IPSec security functions in a well
structured functional architecture. The proposed architecture is modular and allows for
composing software applications from products commercially available and developed by
different suppliers to implement the entire security requirements o f IPSec protocol.

In addition the proposed architecture is robust in the sense that it supports open standards and
interfaces, and implements security functions o f IPSec as an integrated solution under a unified
security management system.
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CHAPTER I:
1.1 Introduction
In the mid 1960’s [1] in the height of the cold war, the Department of Defense (DoD) in
the USA wanted a command and control network that could survive a nuclear war. The
DoD consequently commissioned its research arm- ARPA (Advance Research Project
Agency)- to invent the technology that could get data to its destination reliably even if
arbitrary part of the network disappeared without warning as a result of a nuclear attack.
Traditional telephone technology called circuit switching would not work because it had
serious drawbacks. In circuit switching, a route for data to get from one place to another
is set up by using relays to make physical connections among pieces of cable. Therefore,
if a part of the circuit fails, a new circuit must be set up, which could be quite difficult
and time consuming depending on the severity of the damage [2].
ARPA used a different kind of technology called packet switching. The idea of
packet switching network was proposed by Paul Baran [3]. In packet switching, data to
be sent over the network is divided up into discrete parts called packets. Each packet is
routed independently from one computer to the next over the network until it reaches its
final destination.
The first experimental network- called the ARPANET - went into operation in
December 1969. It consisted of subnets and host computers. The subnets consisted of
minicomputers called IMPs (Interface Message Processors) connected by transmission
lines. This network contained four nodes, one each at UCLA (University of California at
Los Angeles), UCSB (University of California at Santa Barbara), SRI(Stanford Research
Institute) and University of Utah. Each node of the network composed of an IMP and

1
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host in the same room, connected by wires. These four sites were chosen because all had
large ARPA contract; additionally, all four sites had different and completely
incompatible computers. This experimental network grew rapidly: in July 1970 it grew to
eight nodes, by March 1971 it expanded to sixteen nodes, in April 1972 it grew to twenty
three nodes and by September 1972 it consisted of thirty four nodes [1].
In the 1983 TCP/IP protocols were adopted as the only official protocol of the
ARPANET. During the same year the term Internet came into common usage. The old
ARPANET was divided into MILNET, the unclassified part of the Defense Data
Network (DDN), and a new smaller ARPANET. The “Internet” was used to refer to the
entire network: the MILNET plus the ARPANET [1]. Many regional networks in the
USA joined up to the Internet. In the mid 1980’s trans-Atlantic fiber optic cables were
laid and consequently, networks in Europe, the Pacific region and Canada were
connected to the Internet. Growth of the Internet continued exponentially, and by 1995
there were multiple backbones, hundreds of regional networks, tens of thousands of Local
Area Networks (LAN’s), millions of hosts, and tens of millions of users. At the close of
the twentieth century almost every nation was connected to the Internet.
The nature of the Internet has raised many security concerns. The principal
concern over the years is the fact that Internet Protocol (IP) packets are inherently
insecure. It is relative easy to forge IP addresses, modify the contents of IP packets,
replay old content and inspect the content of packets in transit. Therefore, there is no
guarantee that the IP datagrams originated from the source it claims to originate from, or
that they will get to the intended destination, or that the contents have not been modified
or examined by a third party while they were in transit from the source to the destination.

2
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These security problems have caused many companies to stop using the Internet to
transmit electronic data. These companies turned to leased lines and private networks.
The Internet Protocol Security protocol developed by Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) in the late 1990 has addressed most of the IP datagram. The Internet
Architecture Board (LAB) in 1994 issued a report identifying issues concerning
security needs of the network infrastructure [4], In response to these issues IPSec has
been developed.

The purpose of this thesis is to implement the IPSec by using Functional Architecture
Layers. First, however, it is important to have a clear understanding of the related
algorithms, technologies, and operational processes. The following chapters will
cover the concept of security systems, and the operations of IP Security Protocol
(IPSec) and Internet key exchange (IKE), as well as their associated technologies, in
depth. These associated technologies should be thoroughly understood in order to
deploy a robust IPSec security policy and to implement fully operational IPSec
functions.
IPSec is implemented at the network layer. It protects and authenticates IP packets
between participating IPSec devices (peers) such as firewalls, routers, clients, and
other IPSec-compliant products. IPSec is a framework of open standards, which is not
formally limited to any specific set of algorithms. As such, IPSec allows for newer
and better algorithms to be implemented without patching the existing standards, and
it provides data confidentiality, data integrity, and data origin authentication between

3
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participating peers at the IP layer. In the following sections, we will look at the
definitions o f these security services and describe the technologies associated with
them.
IPSec provides the capability to secure communications across a LAN, across private
and public WANs, and across the Internet. In addition, IPSec can play a vital role in
the routing architecture required for internetworking [5]. For example, routing
protocols such as OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) should be run on top o f any
security association (SA) between routers that are defined by IPSec. It is seen that the
IPSec specification has become quite complex. The numerous documents defining
IPSec do not provide a framework for its implementation. The various vendors of
traditional security systems are implementing some o f the IPSec functionality and
security services relying on their own mostly nonstructured functional architecture.
This nonstructured implementation can only provide some sort o f piecemeal
implementation, and cannot address security demanded by efficient implementation
o f IPSec. The key to successful IPSec functional architecture is to consider the
security management as an evolving integrated part o f the architecture.
This thesis is organized into five chapters.
First three chapters provide necessary background information for this topic stating
the problem and thesis contribution. They also provide basic concepts o f network
security threats, TCP/IP overview, and cryptography tools and techniques.
Chapter IV, which is the body o f the thesis, provides the design o f the functional
structures o f IPSec in an integrated form o f modular architecture.
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Chapter Y provides some security session scenarios which will demonstrate the
execution o f the designed IPSec syste in an IPSec environment.
Finally, we conclude this work by summarizing the results, and making suggestions
for future work in Chapter VI.

5
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1-2 Network Security
1-1.1 Introduction to Network Security:
The Internet is changing the way we work, live, play, and learn. These changes are
occurring both in the ways that we currently experience (e-commerce, real-time
information access, e-leaming, expanded communication options, and so forth), and
in ways we have yet to experience. Imagine a day when your enterprise can make all
its telephone calls over the Internet for free. Or perhaps on a more personal note,
consider logging on to a daycare provider’s website to check how your child is doing
throughout the day. As a society, we are just beginning to unlock the potential of the
Internet. But with the Internet’s unparalleled growth comes unprecedented exposure
of personal data, critical enterprise resources, government secrets, and so forth. Every
day hackers pose an increasing threat to these entities with several different types of
attacks. These attacks, outlined in the next section, have become both more prolific
and easier to implement.
There are two primary reasons for this problem.

First is the ubiquity of the

Internet. With millions of devices currently connected to the Internet, and millions
more on the way, a hacker’s access to vulnerable devices will continue to increase.
The ubiquity of the Internet has also allowed hackers to share knowledge on a global
scale. A simple Internet search on the words “hack,” “crack,” or “phreak” yields
thousands of sites, many of which contain malicious code, or the means with which to
use that code.
Second is the pervasiveness of easy-to-use operating systems and development
environments. This factor has reduced the overall ingenuity and knowledge required
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by hackers. A truly remarkable hacker can develop easy-to-use applications that can
be distributed to the masses. Several hacker tools that are available in the public
domain merely require an IP address or host name and a click of a mouse button to
execute an attack [6].

1-1.2 Introduction to Security Threats
A threat or security attack is a potential violation of security or an intrusion for
unauthorized, illegitimate, malicious or fraudulent purposes. These attacks are aimed to
compromise security. The points o f attack (or attacking points) can occur at various
weakness

points within a security perimeter, and can be at any level or layer of

realization, e.g., at the physical system realization level, at the system or network level, at
the communication protocol level, and so on.
Table 1.1 lists some known attacks and their brief descriptions. These are examples of
specific threats that a security management system may need to counter. The nature of
the attacks varies with the circumstances and according to the defined perimeter for the
security. Threats may be classified by their type (e.g., accidental or intentional, passive
or active), by their consequences, or by their sources (e.g., users or programs) and objects
of threats. Our purpose is not to categorize various known (or unknown) threats. This is
beyond the scope of this study. However, we need to be aware of all potential threats (at
all conceivable levels of all natures) in order to come up with security services to counter
them. Typical intentional known threats and the corresponding security services to
counter them are listed in Table 1.1 The goal of this study is to develop an architecture
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that counters the intentional threats by implementing appropriate service(s) for the given
security domain.
THREAT
OR
VIOLATION
(SECURITY
ATTACK)
Eavesdropping

Masquerade

Repudiation

Forgery or fraud

Non-authorized
access

Denial o f Service
& Interruption

Trapdoor

Modification of
Programs
(Trojan
horse,
viruses,
and
worms)
Message
modification,
data
loss
&
corruption

DESCRIPTION

A passive attack
for
disclosure of information

Spoofing, a bogus party
aims to dupe legitimate
parties into giving up
sensitive information
An authorized involved
party subsequently denies
the transaction
A
party
fabricates
information and claims it
came from another party
Attempts to conform to the
rules o f authentication and
access control to gain
information in violation to
the security policy in force
Legitimate
access
to
secured
entities
is
deliberately impeded

CONSEQUENSES

DEFENSE
(REQUIRED
SECURITY
SERVICE)
Confidentiality

Interception; leak o f information;
loss of confidentiality; loss o f
anonymity;
traffic
analysis
deduction
Misuse o f credentials or security Authentication
parameters; incorrectly executed
sign-on procedure; false claim of
origin o f parameters
Denial of origin; denial o f Non-repudiation
delivery; denial of submission,
denial o f a specific action
Integrity,
Fabrication; insertion o f spurious Data
information in a network or to a Access Control,
Authentication
file
Modifying the files; performing Authentication,
actions outside o f the security Access Control
profile;
illegal associations
A party prevents others from
performing
their
functions;
flooding the network with faked
error messages; denial o f access,
denial
of
communication;
deliberate suppression of a
particular party
Intentional or unintentional
violation o f security services

Availability,
Authentication,
Access C ontro l,
Integrity

Software with an invisible
malicious
part,
when
executed, compromises the
security o f the user party

Destruction of the operating
systems,
communication
software, or user application
software

Firewalling, anti
virus,
authentication
access control
Firewalling, anti
virus
program,
data integrity,
authentication

Integrity compromised by
unauthorized
deletion,
insertion,
modification,
replay or delay

Modification or deletion o f
messages, information, and files;

Integrity

A built-in feature that
allows security policy to be
violated

Table 1.1: Security Services to Counter Security Threats
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Not given in Table 1.1, are famous security products/solutions, which are designed for
a particular environment or for a special application. They are considered as customdesigned combinations of the above services. Examples of these are:
1. PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) - a widely used authentication and confidentiality
service.
2. Kerberos - an authentication protocol based on conventional encryption to
authenticate clients to servers, and vice versa. The Version 5 Kerberos was
developed within the Internet community.
3. PEM (Privacy Enhancement Mail)- developed specifically as an Internet
Standard for electronic mail.
For illustration purposes, some typical threats associated with various business
environment are shown in Table 1.2.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
Enterprise Network:
Outside prevention (hackers)
Ensure message authenticity
Protect corporate/individual privacy
Banking:
Fraud protection, prevention o f data modification
Identify legitimate parties
Identify legitimate transactions
Protect PINs from disclosure
Ensure parties' privacy
Government:
Protection against unauthorized disclosure or
manipulation o f information.
Provide electronic signature on documents
Public Networks:
Restrict access to management & administration functions
Protect against service interruptions
Protect users' privacy
Electronic Commerce:
Ensure the source and integrity of transaction
Protect transaction privacy
Provide electronic signatures on transactions

THREATS
Masquerade, data corruption
Eavesdropping

Forgery or fraud
unauthorized access
repudiation, masquerade
Eavesdropping

Masquerade, unauthorized access,
eavesdropping, data loss and corruption
Repudiation
Masquerade, unauthorized access
Service denial
Eavesdropping
Masquerade, data loss and corruption
Eavesdropping
Repudiation

Table 1.2: Typical Threats in Particular Application Environments
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1.1.3 Common type of network Attacks
Without security, both public and private networks are susceptible to unauthorized
monitoring and access. Internal attacks might be a result of minimal or nonexistent
intranet security; while risks from outside the private network stem from connections to
the Internet and extranets. Password-based user access controls alone do not protect data
transmitted across a network.

Without security measures and controls in place, the data might be subjected to an attack.
•

Passive attacks, meaning information is monitored,

•

Active attacks, meaning the information is altered with intent to corrupt or
destroy the data or the network itself.

The networks and data are vulnerable to any type of attacks listed in Table 1.1, as
described in the following bullet items:

•

Eavesdropping
In general, the majority of network communications occur in an unsecured or
“cleartext” format which allows an attacker who has gained access to data paths
in your network to “listen in” or interpret (read) the traffic. When an attacker is
eavesdropping on your communications, it is referred to as sniffing or snooping.
The ability of an eavesdropper to monitor the network is generally the biggest
security problem that administrators face in an enterprise. Without strong
encryption services that are based on cryptography, the data can be read by others
as it traverses the network.

10
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•

Data Modification
After an attacker has read the data, the next logical step is to alter it. An attacker
can modify the data in the packet without the knowledge of the sender or receiver.
Even if the network does not require confidentiality for all communications, you
do not want any of messages to be modified in transit. For example, if we are
exchanging purchase requisitions, we do not want the items, amounts, or billing
information to be modified.

•

Identity Spoofing (IP Address Spoofing)
Most networks and operating systems use the IP address of a computer to identify
a valid entity. In certain cases, it is possible for an IP address to be falsely
assumed— identity spoofing. An attacker might also use special programs to
construct IP packets that appear to originate from valid addresses inside the
corporate intranet. After gaining access to the network with a valid IP address, the
attacker can modify, reroute, or delete the data. The attacker can also conduct
other types of attacks, as described in the following bullet item.

•

Password-Based Attacks
A common denominator of most operating system and network security plans is
password-based access control. This means access rights to a computer and
network resources are determined by the user name and their passwords.

11
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Older applications do not always protect identity information as it is passed
through the network for validation. This might allow an eavesdropper to gain
access to the network by posing as a valid user. When an attacker finds a valid
user account, the attacker has the same rights as the real user. Therefore, if the
user has administrator-level rights, the attacker also can create accounts for
subsequent access at a later time. After gaining access to the network with a valid
account, an attacker can do any of the following:
■ Obtain lists of valid user and computer names and network
information.
* Modify server and network configurations, including access
controls and routing tables.
■ Modify, reroute, or delete any data.

•

Denial-of-Service Attack
Unlike a password-based attack, the denial-of-service attack prevents normal use
of a computer or network by its valid users. After gaining access to the network,
the attacker can do any of the following:
■ Randomize the attention of the internal IS staff so that they do not
see the intrusion immediately, which allows the attacker to make
more attacks during the diversion.
■ Send invalid data to applications or network services, which causes
abnormal termination or behavior of the applications or services.
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* Flood a computer or the entire network with traffic until a
shutdown occurs because of the overload.
■ Block traffic, which results in a loss of access to network resources
by authorized users.

•

Man-in-the-Middle Attack
As the name indicates, a man-in-the-middle attack occurs when someone between
a legitimate user and the person with whom this user is communicating is actively
monitoring, capturing, and controlling the communication transparently.
For example, the attacker can re-route a data exchange. When computers are
communicating at low levels of the network layer, the computers might not be
able to determine with whom they are exchanging data.
Man-in-the-middle attacks are like someone assuming your identity in order to
read your message. The person on the other end might believe it is you because
the attacker might be actively replying as you to keep the exchange going and
gain more information.

This attack is capable of the same damage as an

application-layer attack, described later in this section.

•

Com promised-Key Attack
A key is a secret code or number necessary to interpret secured information.
Although obtaining a key is a difficult and resource-intensive process for an
attacker, it is possible. After an attacker obtains a key, that key is referred to as a
compromised key. An attacker uses the compromised key to gain access to a

13
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secured communication without the sender or receiver being aware of the attack.
With the compromised key, the attacker can decrypt or modify data, and try to use
the compromised key to compute additional keys, which might allow the attacker
access to other secured communications.

•

Sniffer Attack
A sniffer is an application or device that can read, monitor, and capture network
data exchanges and read network packets. If the packets are not encrypted, a
sniffer provides a full view of the data inside the packet. Even encapsulated
(tunneled) packets can be broken open and read unless they are encrypted and the
attacker does not have access to the key. Using a sniffer, an attacker can do any of
the following:
■ Analyze the network and gain information to eventually cause the
network to crash or to become corrupted.
■ Read the communications.

•

Application-Layer Attack
An application-layer attack targets application servers by deliberately causing a
fault in a server’s operating system or applications. This results in the attacker
gaining the ability to bypass normal access controls. The attacker takes advantage
of this situation, gaining control of the application, system, or network, and can
do any of the following:
■ Read, add, delete, or modify the data or operating system.

14
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■ Introduce a virus program that uses computers and software
applications to copy viruses throughout your network.
■ Introduce a sniffer program to analyze the network and gain
information that can eventually be used, to crash or to corrupt
systems and the network.
■ Abnormally terminate the data applications or operating systems.
* Disable other security controls to enable future attacks.

15
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1.2 TCP / IP Overview
1.2.1 Introduction
The Transport Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite proved to be quite
robust and was very adaptable to the different networks. This along with the fact that it
was an open protocol, it was freely available, it was developed independently of any
specific computer hardware or operating system, and it was simple and easy to implement
made it very popular. By 1983, TCP/IP was integrated into release 4.2 of Berkeley
Software Distribution (BSD) UNIX, and the same year, the DoD adopted this protocol
suite as Military Standard (MIL STD) and it became the standard of the Internet.
Today, TCP/IP continues to be the standard for the Internet.

The fact that this protocol was designed to be independent of any specific physical
network hardware has allowed it to be integrated into many different kinds of networks.
TCP/IP is currently integrated into Ethernets, token ring, dialup networks and just about
every other type of physical transmission medium, and virtually all modem operating
systems.
1.2.2 TCP/ IP Protocol architecture
Networking protocols are normally developed in layers, with each layer responsible for a
different facet of the communication [7]. The TCP/IP protocol suite consists of four
layers. Each layer has distinct functions and consists of a consists of a combination of
different protocols as shown in Figure 1.1. The functionalities of the layers are discussed
below.
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Figure 1.1: Protocols at the four layers of the TCP/IP protocol suite.

•

Data-link Layer

The data-link layer is also called the data link or network access layer. It is the lowest
layer of the TCP/IP protocol stack. Example of data-link layers are Ethernet, Token Ring
and ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode). For information on Ethernet refer to [8], for
information on Token Ring see[9], and for further detail on ATM see [10], [11] and [12].
The protocols in data-link layer provide means for the system to deliver data to other
devices on the network. These protocols are concerned with details such as the packet
structure and addressing scheme of the underlining network. Two of the protocols in this
layer are ARP (Address Resolution Protocol), which maps IP addresses to Ethernet
addresses; and RARP (Reverse Address Resolution Protocol), which maps Ethernet
address to IP address. See [13] and [14] for further information on these protocols.
When the data-link layer receives a packet from the network layer the layer, above
it, encapsulates the packet with the appropriate header then sends it via the physical
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network to the specified device. The reverse occurs when a packet arrives from the
physical network to the data link layer: the layer removes the data-link header then sends
the packet up to the network layer for processing. This is illustrated in Figure 1.2.
user data

HTTP
client
HTTP hdr

“T

~

TCP
mmi)
\

TCP hdr

IP
j
IP hdr

V

Ethernet
driver
Eth. hdr

tr.

Ethernet

Figure 1.2: Encapsulation and de-capsulation of data as it goes down and up the protocol stack,
respectively.

•

Network Layer

The network layer is also called the internet layer. This layer is responsible for the
routing of packets from the source host to the destination host. The network layer consists
of three protocols: Internet Control Protocol (ICMP), Internet Group Management
Protocol (IGMP) and Internet Protocol (IP).
The official specification of ICMP is outlined in [15]. ICMP is the protocol that is
used to communicate error conditions that occurred during the transmission of IP packets.
The ICMP message is usually encapsulated in the IP datagram. Another important role of
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ICMP is the debug of network connectivity problems. The popular debugging tools are
ping and traceroute using this protocol.
IGMP is the protocol that is used by hosts and routers to ascertain information about
the hosts in multicast groups; i.e., groups of hosts to which IP datagrams are to be sent
simultaneously. As is the case with ICMP, IGMP messages are encapsulated in IP
datagrams. For further detail on IGMP refer to [16] which contains the original
specification of IGMP.
IP is the protocol that holds the whole TCP/IP protocol suite architecture together.
The data of the protocols in all of the layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack, except the datalink layer, are transmitted as IP datagrams. IP allows hosts to inject packets into the datalink layer, which eventually puts them on the physical network and has them travel on
potentially different networks to their final destination. IP offers a connectionless service.
In connectionless services, each message or datagram carries the full destination address,
and is routed independently of the other datagrams. With connectionless services, it is
possible for the datagrams to arrive at their destination in different order that they were
sent. This is not possible with connection-oriented services, since the latter is like a
telephone system which establishes a connection or a path from the host to the destination
uses the path to send data, and then releases the connection after the data transmission is
completed.

There are two versions of IP that are available for use with the TCP/IP protocol, IPv4 and
IPv6, as discussed in Appendix A l.
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•

Transport Layer

The layer above the network layer in the TCP/IP protocol stack is the transport layer.
This layer provides a flow of data between two hosts, for the application layer above.
Two protocols are implemented at the transport layer, 1) TCP (Transport Control
Protocol) and 2) UDP (User Datagram Protocol). TCP is a reliable connection-oriented
protocol that allows byte streams from a host to be delivered without error to any other
hosts on networks that are reachable. The TCP protocol also breaks up received packets,
re-assembles packet fragments it received from the network layer, and perform flow
control to ensure that a fast hosts does not overwhelm a slower host with more packets
that it can handle. See [17] for further detail On this protocol.

The UDP, unlike TCP, offers an unreliable and connectionless service. It does not
perform any error checking or flow control; it simply sends datagrams from one host to
another and does not provide any guarantee that a datagram will get to its destination.
There is much less overhead involved in processing UDP datagrams compared to TCP
packets. Consequently, the throughput of UDP datagrams is usually greater than that of
TCP. UDP protocol is usually use by applications for which prompt delivery is more
important than accurate delivery; such as in the transmission of speech or video. See [18]
for outline of the original specification of UDP.
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•

Application Layer

The top of the TCP/IP protocol stack is the application layer. This layer includes all
processes that use the transport layer protocols to deliver data. Application layer
protocols usually provide services to the users of the system. There are many application
protocols. The ones that just about all TCP/IP implementation provides include:
-Telnet: The Network Terminal Protocol, which provides remote login.
-FTP: File Transfer Protocol, which is used for file transfer to or from remote hosts.
- SMTP: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, which delivers electronic mail.
- SNMP: Simple Network Management Protocol, which is used for monitoring network
segments.
- DNS: Domain Name Service, which is used for mapping host names onto their IP
addresses.
- HTTP: Hypertext Transfer Protocol, which is used for fetching web pages on the World
Wide Web.
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1.3 Cryptographic tools and Techniques
1.3.1 Introduction
There is no single cryptographic tool. There are various techniques for encrypting
messages, for securely exchanging keys, for maintaining the integrity of messages, and
for guaranteeing authenticity of a message. All of these techniques combined to provide
the services necessary to keep secrets in an increasingly public world.

There is really no such thing as absolute security, but for every secret there is a threat,
and analysis must be made to determine the viability of that threat and the damage that
can be done if they are acted upon. Generally, the strength of a cryptosystem is measured
by its complexity. If the complexity of a particular crypto-system is 232 then it is assumed
that 232 separate operations are required to break it. That is a considerable number of
operations, but if each operation can be performed by a modem computer in hundredths
or thousandths of a second, the system might not be secure enough for the secret it is
protecting. Because of this the term computationally secure is used to express the security
of a modem cryptosystem.

1.3.2 Cryptographic Building Blocks
A good portion of public key cryptography relies upon a foundation of one-way
functions and trapdoors. A one-way function is something that is easy to compute in one
direction but difficult, bordering on impossible, to compute in the other direction. A
trapdoor is a way to sneak back, in effect a way to cheat and return using a secret
passage.
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For a one-way function to be useful in cryptography it must exhibit its one wayness with any input. For example, in a finite field it is easy to compute the product of
numbers but difficult to factor that product. Another number example is the Discrete
Logarithm Problem: with a larger prime, p, and a base generator, g, for a particular value
y, find x where
g x = y mod p
Modular exponentiation is easy, but doing a discrete logarithm to recover the exponent is
hard. For any class of numbers: odd numbers, palindromic numbers, numbers divisible by
47 - the problem of solving the discrete logarithm is still very hard; see [19].

1.3.3 Encryption Concepts and Algorithms
1) Encryption Concepts
Unencrypted message is referred to as “plaintext”. The process of camouflaging a
message in such a way as to conceal its content is known as encryption. An encrypted
message is referred to as “ciphertext”. The process of converting ciphertext back into
plaintext is known as decryption.
2) Cryptographic algorithm
A cryptographic algorithm, also called a cipher, is the mathematical function used for
encryption and decryption. For better security, quality control and standardization,
modem cryptography incorporates the concept of a key. This key can take many values
(usually denoted in binary bits), and is analogous to the combination of a lock. Although
the concept of a combination lock is well known, it is often difficult to open a
combination lock without knowing the combination. In addition, the more numbers in a
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given combination, the more time consuming it will be to guess the combination. The
same is true for cryptographic keys; hence the more bits in a key the less susceptible a
key is to being compromised. Therefore, the security robustness in modem day ciphers is
based on the key rather than the details of the cipher known as encryption algorithm. This
doesn’t matter if an eavesdropper knows the algorithm; if the particular key is not
revealed, the message cannot be read by anyone.
3) Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the security service that protects data and the external characteristics of
communication from unauthorized disclosure by concealing source and destination
addresses, message length or frequency of communication. With confidentiality, the
intended recipients know what was being sent but unintended parties cannot determine
what was sent. Encryption algorithms can be used to provide confidentiality.
There are two general types of key-based algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric,
o

Symmetric Algorithms

In symmetric algorithms, the encryption key can be calculated from the
decryption key and vice versa. In this case, encryption and decryption use the
same mathematical functions, and the encryption key and the decryption key are
identical. Symmetric algorithms, also known as secret-key algorithms, require that
the sender and receiver agree on a key before they can transmit and receive
information securely, as it demonstrated in Figure 1.3.
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Cewlfeferrtiality

Figure 1.3: Schematic Example for Symmetric Cryptography

The security of a symmetric algorithm lies in the key; disclosing the key implies
that anyone could encrypt and decrypt the messages. Therefore, it is mandatory
that the key remain secret.

Symmetric algorithms are further categorized into stream and block ciphers.
Block ciphers operate on one block of data (usually in 64-bit block size) at a time.
Stream ciphers conversely operate on data one bit (or one byte) at a time. In either
case, they are ideal for bulk encryption. As block ciphers are used only in IPSec,
stream ciphers are beyond the scope of this study.
Cipher mode refers to a set of techniques used to apply a block cipher to a data
stream. Four basic modes are used:
-

Electronic code book (ECB)

-

Cipher block chaining (CBC)

-

Cipher feedback (CFB)

-

Output feedback (OFB)

An example of a symmetric block in CBC mode is the Data Encryption Standard
(DES). DES encrypts data in 64-bit blocks and the same algorithm and key are
used for both encryption and decryption. The key length is 56 bits. The key can be
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any 56-bit number and can be altered any time. DES breaks a massage into 64-bit
blocks, XORs the first block with the Initialization Vector (IV), and encrypts it
with the 56-bit key. The result is a 64-bit block of cipher text that is further
XORed with the next 64-bit block. This process is repeated until the entire
message has been encrypted.
There is a more secure variant of DES. called “3DES”. In 3DES, pronounced
“Triple-DES” the DES algorithm is applied 3 times to each 64-bit plaintext block,
using a different 56-bit key each time. A typical approach uses two different 56bit keys, K1 and K2, yielding a length of 112 bits, with K1 being reused for the
final (third) encrypt. Other applications use three different 56-bit keys, K l, K2,
and K3, and K3, yielding a total key length of 168 bits. Using the same key in all
three steps will yield the same result as encrypting with conventional DES. Due to
the second step being a decryption operation [20],

Over the years, a number of symmetric cryptosystems have been proposed as
possible replacement for DES. Some of these cryptosystems will be introduced
below.
•

Blowfish: Blowfish was developed by Bruce Schneier [21]. It uses a key
of variable length: from 32 to 448 bits to encrypt blocks of 64-bit plaintext
into blocks of 64-bit ciphertext. Blowfish has a simple structure which
makes it easy to implement. Currently, Blowfish is one of the fastest
encryption systems. The variable length key allows for varied degree of
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security. It is believed that Blowfish is very secure, particularly when
longer keys are used.
•

CAST-128: CAST was developed by Carlisle Adams and Stafford
Tavares [22]. It uses a key that varies between 40 to 128 bits in length, in
8-bits increments; and produces 64-bit blocks ciphertext from blocks of
64-bit plaintext. The CAST algorithm involves 16 rounds of computations
which are quite complex. This algorithm has received widespread review
and it is believed to be quite safe.

•

International Data Encryption Algorithm

(IDEA):

IDEA was

developed by Xuejia Lai and James Massey at the Swiss Institute of
Technology (ETH in Zurich). The original specification and later
modifications are outlined in [23] and [24] respectively. IDEA uses a 128bit key and encrypts plaintext in blocks of 64 bits and output 64-bits
blocks ciphertext. IDEA enciphering algorithm has received a fair bit of
attention and it is believed that to be quite secure for a number of years.
•

RC2: RC2 was developed by Ronald Rivest [25]. It is designed to be
easily implemented on 16-bit microprocessors. The algorithm uses a key
of variable length: from 8 bytes to 128 bytes and enciphers block of 64-bit
plaintext to output blocks of ciphertext of 64 bits, inlength.

•

RC5: RC5 was developed by Ronald Rivest [26]; a later description is
given in [27], RC5, like DES, is suitable for both hardware and software
implementation. It is adaptable to processor of different word length. The
number of bits in the processor’s word is one of the inputs to the RC5
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algorithm. RC5 algorithm also has variable number of rounds, which
allows tradeoff between higher speed and higher security. The algorithm
uses a variable length key to encrypt plaintext blocks of 32, 64 or 128 bits
and output blocks of ciphertext of corresponding length. RC5 has a low
memory requirement which therefore, makes it suitable to be used in
applications such as smart cards that have limited memory,
o Asymmetric Algorithms
Asymmetric algorithms are designed so that the key used for encryption is
different from the key used for decryption as it is shown schematically in
Figurel.4.

Public
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Figure 1.4: Schematic Example for Asymmetric Cryptography

In addition, the decryption key cannot be derived from the encryption key. These
algorithms are referred to as public-key algorithms, because the encryption key is
made public. In other words, anyone can use the encryption key (public key) to
encrypt a message, but only a specific recipient with the corresponding decryption
key (private key) can decrypt the message. In other instances the message can be
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encrypted with private key and decrypted with the public key. This is typically
used in digital signatures.
An example of a public key cipher is the RSA algorithm developed by Ron
Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman. The public and private keys are
functions of a pair of large prime numbers. The security of this approach is based
on the fact that it can be relatively easy to multiply these large prime numbers
together but extremely difficult to factor the resulting product. In other words,
anyone attempting to recover the text plain from the cipher text and the public key
will have to go through the knotty task of guessing Hie decryption (private) key by
factoring the resulting product of two large prime numbers. RSA uses a key
length of 512 bits, 768 bits, 1024 bits, or longer. A longer key length offers
stronger security, but also uses up more CPU processing cycles. This is due to the
fact that the mathematical computations in the RSA algorithm are much more
complicated than the DES algorithm [28]. As a result, in hardware, RSA is about
1000 times slower than DES, and in software, DES is up to 100 times faster than
RSA. These numbers may change slightly as technology advances, however, RSA
will never approach the speed of symmetric algorithms, which makes it an
unlikely candidate for bulk data encryption [29].
Public-key algorithms such as RSA are rarely used for data confidentiality
(encryption) because of the performance constraints mentioned earlier. Instead,
they are most often used in applications involving authentication via digital
signatures and key management. In real life, public key algorithms are not
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surrogates for symmetric algorithms. They are typically used to encrypt keys
instead of messages.

1.3.4 Hashing Concepts and Algorithms
1) Hashing Concepts
A one-way hash function is a mathematical function that is easy to compute in the
forward direction, but computationally infeasible to reverse. An input message runs
through the mathematical function (the hash function) and results in a string of output bits
called a hash (or a message digest). The process is irreversible, that is, the input cannot be
derived from the output. It is analogous to a coffee grinder. Imagine the message is the
coffee beans and the output hash is the resulting ground coffee. It is quite impossible to
take the ground coffee and recreate the original coffee beans. In addition, a hash function
takes a message of arbitrary length and produces a fixed-length output [30],
It is important to implement keyed hashing because only performing a one way hash on
some data does not provide any authentication. A hash function alone is like a checksum.
Anybody can modify the data and just run the hash algorithm over the modified data. A
keyed hash function is a message authentication code (MAC), which, in other words, is a
one-way hash function encrypted using private key. A MAC is generated through hashing
a shared privet key along with message.

The concept is the same as hash functions, except now only the holder of the secret key
can verify the hash value. Figure 1.5 illustrates how keyed hashing works [31].
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Figure 1.5: A keyed hashing function (MAC)

Keyed hashing can be used to generate a hash (MAC) on each IP packet in an IP
data stream. These hashes then become part of the IP packet and are used to verify the
integrity of the IP packet when it is received. The recipient runs the same hash (plus
shared secret key) on each received IP packet and compares it with the inserted hash
value. If nothing in the packet has been modified in transit the results are the same and
the integrity of the IP packet remains intact. Common keyed hash functions include:
-

Message Digest 5 (MD5) is a one-way hash that combines a shared secret and
the message, to produce a hash. MD5 processes the input text in 512-bit blocks,
divided into 16 x 32-bit subblocks. The output is a set of 4 x 32-bit blocks,
concatenated to form a single 128-bit hash value.

-

Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) is similar to MD5 but the algorithm output is a
set of 5x 32-bit blocks, concatenated to form a single 160-bit hash value.

Note that all message authentications in IPSec use hashed MAC (HMAC) described in
[32] so MD5 becomes HMAC-MD5 and SHA becomes HMAC-SHA. HMAC is a
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variant that provides an additional level of hashing making it cryptographically stronger
than principal hashing function.
2) Integrity Service
Integrity is a security service that ensures that any modifications to data are detectable.
There are two types of integrity in a TCP/IP environment: connectionless and partial
sequence integrity. Connectionless integrity is a service that detects the modification of
individual IP packets without regard to the ordering of the packet in a traffic stream.
Partial sequence integrity is referred to as antireplay integrity, and it detects arrival of
duplicate IP packets. With integrity, data is transmitted from source to destination
without undetected change. Hashing algorithms can be used to provide integrity.
Although authentication and integrity services are often mentioned separately, in practice
they are closely related, and almost always offered together.
3) Key Exchanges
Symmetric algorithms and keyed hashing both require a shared key. The security of the
encryption and authentication techniques can be completely undermined by an insecure
key exchange. With symmetric encryption, the data encryption key is always present and
remains fixed. Any intruder who compromises the encryption key can decrypt messages
encrypted with it. A common cryptographic technique is to encrypt each individual
conversation with a separate key. This is referred to as a session key since it is used for
only one particular communication and destroyed when it is no longer needed. As such,
the risk of compromising the session (encryption) key is reduced significantly. In the
following section, we look at how the Diffie- Heilman key exchange algorithm can be
used to ensure the secure exchange of keys.
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o Diffie- Heilman key exchange
Diffie- Heilman was the first public key algorithm developed [33], It is secure
because of the complexity of calculating discrete logarithms in a finite field, as
compared with the ease of calculating modular exponentiation in the same field.
Diffie- Heilman can be used to distribute a shared secret key between parties in a
key exchange across an insecure communication channel such as the Internet.
All participants in a Diffie- Heilman exchange must first choose a group. This
group defines the prime p and the generator (primitive) g to be used. The DiffieHellmanexchange comprises two parts. In part 1 each side, Alice and Bob,choose
a random number (which becomes their private key) and does exponentiation to
produce a public value.
-

Alice: public-value-A = ga MOD p (where a is the random number chosen
by Alice).

-

Bob: public-value-B = gb MOD p (where b is the random number chosen
by Bob).

In part 2, Alice and Bob exchange their public values. In other words, Alice
provides public-value-A to Bob, and Bob provides public-value B to Alice.
Each side then does an exponentiation again, this time using the other party’s
public value as the generator, which creates the shared secret key, Z;
- Alice: (public-value-B)a MOD p= gab MOD p = Z
- Bob: (public-value-A)b MOD p = gab MOD p = Z
Once Alice and Bob know the shared secret key Z, they can use it to protect
their communications with any conventional secret-key algorithms. Anyone
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who knows p or g will not be able to calculate the shared secret value Z easily
because it is very complicated to compute a discrete logarithm to recover the
secret exponents (private keys) Alice and Bob used.
One of the inadequacies with key exchange systems is that the same session
key is distributed to numerous sessions. If this key is leaked, it can be used to
deciypt the earlier encrypted traffic. Diffle-Hellman can be used to achieve
Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), which eliminates the need for using long-life
session keys. With PFS, a separate Diffie-Hellman session key (secret key) is
generated for each session. If any of these keys are recovered, they will only
provide access to that specific session’s information. The remaining keys that
are used to encrypt other sessions are not compromised.
Nevertheless, the Diffie-Hellman exchange still has some limitations.
Alice and Bob can use this algorithm to generate and distribute a shared secret
key, however, it cannot be used to encrypt and deciypt messages. Another
drawback of the Diffie-Hellman exchange is that Alice and Bob have no way
to verify that they are talking to each other, so the exchange can be subject to
a man-in-the middle attacks. In other words, Diffie-Hellman provides for
confidentiality but not for authentication. In this case, authentication can be
achieved via the use of digital signatures in the Diffie-Hellman message
exchanges.
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1.3.5 Authentication Mechanisms
1) Introduction
Data origin authentication is a security service that verifies the identity of the claimed
source of data. This service is usually bundled with connection-less integrity service.
With data-origin authentication, we have to ensure that the data received is the same as
the data that was sent and that the claimed sender is, in fact, the actual sender.
Mechanisms such as the exchanges of digital certificates can be use to provide data origin
authentication.

Confidentiality is mandatory to protect a secret. Without authentication, there is no way
of validating and identifying the person with whom you share the secret as who he or she
claims to be. In the following sections, we will examine additional authentication
mechanisms that can help us identify and validate a sender [36].

2) Digital signatures
A digital signature is an encrypted message digest that is appended to a document. It is
used to validate the identity of the sender and the integrity of the document. In practical
implementations, digital signatures are created by combining hash functions with publickey algorithms. Because the entire document must be known before signature generation,
HMAC rather than digital signatures are used to provide the message integrity of an
ongoing data stream.
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Instead of signing (encrypting) a document, Alice signs (encrypts) the hash of the
document to produce the digital signature and appends it to the original document. Figure
1.6 shows an example of how a digital signature is created.

Message
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Figure 1.6: digital signature generation.

Digital signatures require the exchange of public keys beforehand. This exchange of
public keys is again susceptible to man-in the middle-attack because during the exchange
process, there is no way to guarantee that the public keys, which Alice and Bob have
received from each other, are genuine. Some imposter (man-in-the middle) can substitute
Alice’s public key with his own fabricated public key, therefore, tricking Alice into
believing that the public key she has received is actually from Bob. In the next section,
we will look at how digital certificates can be used to thwart this kind of attack [34],
3) Digital certificates
A digital certificate (also commonly referred as public-key certificate) is someone’s
public key, signed and verified by another trustworthy party. Certificates are used to foil
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attempts to substitute one’s key for another. Typically, a digital certificate uses the X.509
standard format [35].
4) Digital envelopes
Digital signature and digital certificate provide proof of identity but they do not provide
for privacy. To incorporate confidentiality, we put the signed document into an envelope
and encrypt the envelope. Typically, the envelope contains encrypted content and
encrypted content-encryption keys for the recipient. The combination of encrypted
content and encrypted content encryption keys for a recipient is referred as a digital
envelope (encrypted message) for that recipient. The process by which enveloped data is
constructed by the sender involves the following steps:
1) A content-encryption key for a particular content-encryption (symmetric)
algorithm is generated at random.
2) The content is encrypted with the content-encryption key.
3) The content-encryption key is encrypted with the recipient’s public key.
The encrypted message and encrypted key are represented together according to the
syntax of the public key cryptography standard#7 (PKCS #7) [35]. PKCS #7 is a
general syntax for data that may be encrypted or signed, such as digital signatures
or digital envelopes. The syntax is recursive, so that envelopes can be nested.
Digital envelopes are used during CA (Certificate Authority) transactions to ensure
the secure distribution of the certificates (PKCS#7 wrapped) to the users [35]. At
the receiving end, the recipient opens the envelope by decrypting the encrypted
content-encryption keys with the recipient’s private key and decrypting the
encrypted content with the recovered content-encryption key.
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CHAPTER II: INTERNET PROTOCOL SECURITY (IPSEC) ARCHITECTURE:

2.1 Introduction:
IPSec is a framework of open standards developed by IETF [36]. It identifies a set of
methods that intend to protect network traffic at the IP or network layer. It is a mandatory
component of IP Version 6, (IPv6) and an optional one in IP Version 4, (IPv4).
IP packets have no inherent security. It is relatively easy to forge the addresses of IP
packets, modify the contents of IP packets, replay old packets, and inspect the contents of
IP packets in transit. Therefore, there is no guarantee that IP datagrams received are:
(1) from the claimed sender (the source address in the IP header);
(2) that they contain the original data that the sender placed in them; or
(3) that the original data was not inspected by a third party while the packet was being
sent from source to destination. IPSec' is a method of protecting IP datagrams. This
protection takes the form of data content confidentiality, data origin authentication,
connectionless data integrity authentication, anti-replay protection, and limited traffic
flow confidentiality.
IPSec can be used in three types of scenarios. The first one is protection of one or more
data communications between two hosts. The second one is protection of data
communication between two security gateways which connect two networks. The third
one is protection of data between a security gateway and a host such as remote login.
These three scenarios can take place across a public network such as the Internet, or
within a LAN. In either case, IPSec content can not be observed, in ESP protocol, or
modified, in AH protocol, by a third party. This provides a transparent service for
building applications that are unaware of the existence of IPSec in the Network Layer.
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Consequently, the application development process is simplified by not integrating any
security mechanism for transport service purposes.
IPSec provides specific security services at the IP layer. It enables a host or a
security gateway to select one or more specific security protocol(s), such as AH and ESP,
encryption and authentication algorithm(s), such as DES, RSA, and cryptographic keys.
The set of security services that IPSec can provide includes are listed below for quick
reference:
-

Confidentiality(Encryption)

Confidentiality is “the property of communicating such that the intended recipients know
exactly what was being sent but unintended parties can not determine what was sent”.
-

Data Origin Authentication

Data Origin Authentication is “knowing that the data received is the same as the data that
was sent and that the claimed sender is in fact the actual sender”.
-

Connectionless Integrity

Connectionless integrity (for protocols such as UDP) is “the property of ensuring that the
data is transmitted from source to destination without undetected alteration”. The
integrity check is done on a per-packet basis. This is in contrast to connection integrity,
where the integrity check is done on a stream of packets.
-

Access Control:

Access control is the ability to limit and control the access to a host system and
application via communications links. In order to achieve this control, each entity
(a user or a program) trying to gain access must first be identified or authenticated, and
then authorized, based on access rights assigned to it.
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- Rejection of Replayed Packets:
Rejection of replayed Packets is the ability to detect and reject any replayed packets that
can be saved by an attacker.
All of these services are implemented in the IP layer as shown in Figure 2.1.

TCP
Encryption is done
in (Ms layer

IC M P

IP Layer

Network I n t e r f a c e

L ayer

Figure 2.1 IPSec Encryption not evident in applications

Therefore, all other higher layer protocols such as TCP, UDP, and ICMP can utilize
IPSec without knowing it even exists. This provides an outstanding feature for software
developers because they do not need to implement any security mechanisms in their
software for transport purposes.

2.2 IPSec Implementation in TCP/IP Stack
There are three ways to implement IPSec within the TCP/IP protocol stack [5]:
A) Above the IP Layer - In this kind of implementation, source code of the IP layer
m u st b e available in order to m odify it. In addition, the logical interface b etw een

IP and TCP layers must be implemented.
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B) Within the IP Layer - In this kind of implementation, source code of the IP layer
must be available so that it can be modified to integrate the functionality of IPSec
protocol.
C) Below the IP layer - In this method, the implementation is started from scratch
and it does not need the TCP/IP source code. However, certain TCP/IP functions
must be re-implemented such as dealing with fragmentation and reassembly of
fragmented packets.

2.3 The IPSec Roadmap
The IPSec protocols include AH, ESP, IKE, ISAKMP/Oakley, and transforms. In order
to understand, implement, and use IPSec, it is necessary to understand the relationship
among these components. The IPSec roadmap and related documents define how various
components of IPSec interact with each other. This is shown in Figure 2.2, and explained
as follows.

AH

Encr^ptktn Algorithm

Authentication Algorithm

Key M tM g c n m t

Figure 2.2 IPSec R oadm ap (this figure has been reproduced from the draft with permission o f the authors)
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Architecture: Covers the general concepts, security requirements, definitions, and
mechanisms defining IPSec technology.
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP): Covers the packet format and general issues
related to the use of the ESP for packet encryption and, optionally, authentication.
Authentication Header (AH): Covers the packet format and general issues related to the
use of AH for packet authentication.
Encryption Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various encryption
algorithms are used for ESP.
Authentication Algorithm: A set of documents that describe how various authentication
algorithms are used for AH and for the authentication option of ESP.
Key Management: Documents that describe key management schemes.
Domain of Interpretation (DOI): Contains values needed for the other documents to
relate to each other. These include identifiers for approved encryption and authentication
algorithms, as well as operational parameters such as key lifetime [8].

2.4 How IPSec Works
IPSec is designed to provide high quality, interoperable cryptographic - based security for
IPv4 and IPv6 datagrams. IPSec achieves these objectives by use of two traffic security
protocols Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) and
through the use of cryptographic key management procedures and protocols such as
Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKE).
The IP AH protocol provides data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and
an optional anti-replay service.
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The IP ESP protocol provides data confidentiality, limited traffic-flow confidentiality,
connectionless integrity, data-origin authentication and anti-replay service. There are two
modes of operation of both AH and ESP: transport mode and tunnel mode. AH and ESP
can be applied, in the desired mode alone or in combination with each other. The Internet
Key Exchange (IKE) protocol is used to negotiate the choices of the cryptographic
algorithms to be utilized by AH and ESP, and put in place the necessary cryptographic
keys that the algorithms require. AH, ESP and IKE protocols will be discussed in more
detail in later sections.
The protocols that IPSec uses are designed to be algorithm independent. The choice
of algorithms is specified in the Security Policy Database (SPDB)*. The possible choices
of algorithms that are available are dependent on the IPSec implementation; however, a
standard set of default algorithms are specified by IPSec to ensure interoperability in the
global Internet.
IPSec allows the user or administrator of a system or a network to control the
granularity at which the security service is offered. For example an organization’s policy
might specified that data traffic that originated from certain subnet(s) should be protected
with both AH and ESP and that the encryption should be done with triple-DES with three
different keys; whereas, the policy might specified that data traffic from another site
should be protected with only ESP and that these traffic should be afforded encryption
with DES1. IPSec is able to differentiate between the security service it offers to different
data traffic by the us of Security Association (SA).

* In the proposed architecture used in this thesis, we refer to the required database as Security Management
Information Base (SMIB), see chapter IV.
t See “IPSec Policy and Business Management Layer,” Section 4.2
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2.5 IPSec Modes
IPSec sessions can be implemented in two different modes: Transport and tunnel mode
IPSec in the transport mode is used to establish an end-to-end secure communication
channel between the source and destination hosts. All packets are secure once they leave
the source host, until they reach the destination host as shown in Figure 2.3. Generally,
this mode is used within LANs.

End - to End Secure Communication ChannelR e c e iv in g
H o st

S e n d in g
H ost

Server

Figure 2.3: IPSec in Transport Mode

In the tunnel mode shown in Figure 2.4, IP packets are protected only between this two
defined tunnel points or security gateways.

Unsecure Channel

Gateway - Gateway
Secure Channel

Unsecure Channel

The Internet
Inter anet

Figure 2.4: IPSec Tunnel Mode
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When packets are transmitted between the client and the security gateway, they are
sent in an unprotected format until they reach the initial gateway. Then protection is
applied and the packets are sent to the receiving network security gateway, where they
are decrypted and forwarded in clear text to the destination host.

2.6

Security Association
2.6.1 Security Association (SA) Concept
Before any IPSec traffic is exchanged between a source and destination host,
both parties must establish their security parameters through a handshake that
determines

several

security

parameters

such

as

encryption

algorithm,

authentication algorithm, encryption keys, and the chosen protocol (AH or ESP).
The IPSec protocol uses the Security Association (SA) mechanism to provide
groundwork to manage these security parameters. Both AH and ESP IPSec
protocols need an established SA before any communication can take place.
Thus, SA is a unidirectional communication that identifies the security
parameters. To protect a distinctive bi-directional communication using AH or
ESP protocol, two SAs are required, one in each direction [37]. If both AH and
ESP protocols are used simultaneously, two or more SAs are needed. This is
called an SA bundle. Each SA is uniquely identified by the following three
parameters [37]:
a) The packet destination address
b) The IPSec protocols, either AH or ESP
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c) A Security Parameter Index (SPI) which is chosen by the receiver and is
transmitted in a clear text.
The IPSec protocol stack uses a Security Association Database (SADB) to store
all active SAs. This database contains all the parameters pertaining to each SA.
Sender and receiver hosts consult the SADB for every received or sent packet to
determine how to deal with them. The SA, or the contract between the sender and
receiver hosts, contains fields that are needed by both parties to process every
incoming and outgoing IP packet. Some fields are used for outbound processing,
some for inbound processing, and some for both, depending on usage of the field
[37] The fields for the SA is given in Appendix [A2].

2.6.2 Security Databases
There are at least two databases that are necessary for the processing of IPSec traffic:
Security Policy Database (SPDB) and Security Association Databases (SADB). SPDB
specifies the policies that are to be applied to the traffic that is destined to, or originated
from a given host or network. On the other hand, SADB contains the active SA
parameters. For both SPDB and SADB, separate inbound and outbound databases are
required. The objects stored in these database are summarized in Appendix A3.

Each entry in the SPDB consists of one or more selectors, an indication of
whether the packets that match the selectors) in the entry should be discarded, be
subject to IPSec processing or not be subject to IPSec processing. If the packets are to
be subjected to IPSec processing, the entry also contains a pointer to a Security
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Association (SA) specification which details the IPSec protocols, modes and
algorithms to be applied to the packets matching this policy entry.
The first entry with selector(s) matching that/those corresponding to the traffic
under consideration will be applied. If no matching entry is found, the packets for the
traffic under consideration will be discarded. The entries in the SPDB should
therefore be ordered according to the desired preference of application.
The entries in the SPDB determine the granularity with which the traffic is
processed. For example, the policies could specify that IPSec service corresponding
to a given SA or SA bundle should be applied to all traffic to or from any source or
destination; or, the policy could specify the application of different SAs or SA
bundles based on specifed selectors. The SPDB therefore plays a very important role
in the control of the flow of all traffic through an IPSec system.

Separate SADB are kept for inbound and outbound IPSec processing for inbound
or outbound traffic, the respective SADB is searched for selectors matching the SPI,
the source or destination address and IPSec protocol, extracted from the packet
header. If a matching entry is found, the parameter for this SA are compared with the
appropriate fields in the AH or ESP headers. If the header fields correspond with the
SA parameters in the database, the packet is processed. However, if there are any
discrepancies, the packet is discarded. If no SA entry matches the selectors, the
packet is discarded if it is an inbound packet. If the packet however is outbound, a
new SA or SA bundle will be created and entered in the outbound SADB.
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A SA lifetime has two kind of limit: a soft limit and a hard limit. When the soft
limit is reached, the communicating peers must re-negotiate a new SA to replace the
existing one. However, the existing SA is not delected form the database until the
hard limit expires. Unlike the SPDB, the entries in the SAD are not ordered.
Nonetheless, as is the case with SPDB lookups, the first matching SA entiy that is
found in the SAD is used for the IPSec processing of the packets that are associated
with the given SA.

2.7 IPSec Principle of Operation
The IPSec processes ensure secure communication between two communicating hosts
based on a policy that is defined in a Security Policy Database (SPDB). The system
administrator is responsible for establishing and maintaining the SPDB. Source and
destination hosts check with the SPDB to make a decision, for each IP packet, whether
the IP packet has to be protected by IPSec, or discarded, or allow it to bypass the IPSec
stack.
SPDB is organized as an ordered list of rules. Each rule is identified by one or more
selectors that define the type of IP traffic that will be affected by IPSec. Selectors might
be the source and destination IP addresses the SPI, source and destination port numbers,
and the protocol ID. Once the SPDB is consulted by the source or destination hosts with a
specific selector, the established SA param eters are retrieved. T able 2.2 show s an

example of SPDB.
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Security Policy Parameters

Example Values

SPI

3219011

IP Destination Address

172.16.16.10

IP Destination Port

23

IP Source Address

172.16.16.15

IP Source Port

3290

Protocol

TCP
Table 2.2: Example of SPDB

The processing of IPSec packets are done as follows [5], [6], [7], [8]:
-

Outbound Traffic
Once the IPSec processes receive an IP packet to be sent from an application,
it consults the SPDB to decide how to process this IP packet. If the packet
must be IPSec enabled, an IPSec process retrieves the required SA from the
SADB. If the necessary SA already exists, it is used to process the IP packet.
In the contrary case, an IPSec process calls Internet Key Exchange protocol
(IKE) to establish a new SA with specific security parameters.
For example, let us consider the network shown in the Figure 2.5. In this
case, the host is tunneling a packet to the gateway using ESP but is
authenticating to the end host B.

Figure 2.5: Outbound IPSec Processing
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The correct header is shown in Figure 2.6.

IP header

ESP

Src = Host A
Dst = Gateway B

IP header

AH

Network payload

Src = H ostA
Dst = Host B
Figure 2.6 packet format

In this case, IKE establishes four SAs two for sending and two for receiving.
As we are discussing the outbound processing, we will ignore the SAs
established for processing inbound packets. The two outbound SAs are SAi
and SA2 where SAi is the SA between A and the gateway and SA2 is the SA
between the host and the destination. The ordering of IPSec processing is very
important. If SA2 is applied after SA], the packet is formed incorrectly. It is
very important to maintain ordering in the SA bundle so that IPSec processing
is applied in the correct order for outbound packets.
-

Inbound Traffic
Once the ISPec process receives an IP packet from the network, it inspects the
header to decide if this packet was IPSec-enabled. If so , the IPSec process
uses information in the incoming packet to determine the selectors that will be
used to retrieve the defined policy from the SPDB. It also retrieves a pointer
to the corresponding SADB where the security parameters are stored. These
security parameters will be used for checking and/or deciphering of the packet
in question.
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- Fragmentation
IPSec does not fragment or reassemble packets. On outbound processing, the
transport payload is processed and then passed on to the IP layer for further
processing. On inbound processing; the IPSec layer gets a reassembled packet
from the IP layer. However, as IPSec does add IPSec header, it impacts the
Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU) length. If IPSec does not participate in
PMTU discovery, the IP layer ends up fragmenting a packet as the addition of
the IPSec header increases the length of the IP datagram beyond the PMTU. It
is important for IPSec to participate in the PMTU discovery process. This is
discussed in greater detail in the Chapter IV on IPSec implementation.
-

Internet Control Massage Protocol (ICMP)

ICMP (Internet Control Massage Protocol) processing is critical to the
operation and debugging for a network. This protocol is runs on top o f a
network protocol such as IPv4 and IPv6. When IPSec is used end-to-end, it
does not impact ICMP. However, when IPSec is used in tunnel mode, it
impacts ICMP and the operation of the network. The problem arises in the
tunnel mode, particularly when the tunnel header is added by an intermediate
gateway. This is because ICMP messages are required to send only 64 bits of
the original header. ICMP is used to determine if the host is reachable or not.
ICMP is used in PMTU (Path Maximum Transfer Uunit) discovery If a router
needs to fragment a packet but the “do not fragment” bit is set, then the router
sends back an ICMP massage to host indicating the MTU of its link so that
the host can generate packets whose size does not exceed this MTU.
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In order to handle ICMP error messages correctly, IPSec needs to maintain
some state and perform extra processing.
-

Path MTU

By default, the Maximum Segment Size (MSS) is 536 bytes. It is the
maximum number of bytes that can be transported by TCP in a single packet.
TCP fragments packets in a transmit queue into 536 byte chunks before
passing them down to the IP layer. With a 536-byte MSS, packets are not
likely to be fragmented at an IP device along the path to the destination
because most links use an MTU of at least 1500 bytes. However, smaller
packets also increase the amount of bandwidth used to transport overheads.
Most routers of Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) are equipped with a
commode that can dynamically determine the largest MSS value without
generating packets that need to be fragmented. It allows TCP to determine the
smallest MTU size among all links in a TCP session and then this MTU value,
less the number of bytes taken up by the IP and TCP headers, as the MSS for
the session.
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CHAPTER HI: IPSec PROTOCOLS
3.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we briefly review various IPSec protocols and their features. IETF has
defined three protocols in IPSec:
1) IP Authentication Header (AH) Protocol “AH provides connectionless integrity,
data origin authentication, and an optional anti-replay service” for each IP datagram
packet [38].
2) Encapsulating Security Payload(ESP) Protocol “ESP provides data confidentiality
(encryption), limited traffic flow confidentiality, connectionless integrity, data origin
authentication, and an optional anti-replay service” for each IP datagram packet [43].

1) Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
“ISAKMP provides a method for automatically setting up security associations
and managing the cryptographic keys” [44]. The details of these protocols are
explained in the following sections.

3.2 The IP Authentication Header (AH) Protocol
3.2.1

Authentication Header (AH) Concept
The IP protocol is inherently insecure. The authentication mechanism that is used
to provide integrity for the IP datagrams is rather primitive. The Authentication
Header (AH) protocol was designed to improve the security of IP datagrams. AH
provides connectionless integrity and data origin authentication and an anti-replay
protection service [23]. AH uses cryptographic Message Authentication Codes
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(MAC) to authenticate IP datagrams. A MAC requires a secret key to generate the
message digest of a bit-string. IPSec uses Internet Key Exchange (IKE) to
negotiate, generate and put in place necessary cryptographic keys for AH or ESP.
Since only the source and the destination nodes know the secret key, it should be
computationally infeasible for an intruder to modify the datagram and recompute
an authentication data that will be validated by the hosts. This is illustrated in
Figure 3.1.
Original iP datagram
IP header

other headers and payioads

'

i

Digital signature (MD5 or SHA-1)

ip

other headers and payloads

Auth. header

Authenticated IP datagram

Figure 3.1: Procedure for Authenticated IP Datagram

3.2.2

AH Protocol Format
According to IPSec specifications, data authentication is implemented by using an
Authentication Header (AH) [23]. The AH is additional information, i.e.,a field,
that is added to each IP datagram. It is calculated using all the fields in the IP
datagram (IP header, TCP header, and user data). IP fields that change, such as
Time-to-Live (TTL), are not included in the calculation. Figure 3.2 shows the AH
protocol format in IPv4 for both the Transport Mode and the Tunnel Mode. As
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can be seen in Figure 3.2 for IPv4, the AH header is placed immediately after the
IP header and before any transport protocol and user data.
original IPv4 packet
original
IP header

TCPAJDP
header

AH in tunnel m ode

AH In tran sp o rt m ode
original
AH
IP header heads

TCPAJDP
1 eader

new
original
AH
IP header header IP header

data

Payload
Length

data f

encrypted

encrypted _

au thenticated

au th en ticated

Next
Header

TCPAJDP
header

Security
Parameter Index

Authentication Data
(Hash Checksum)

Sequence
Number

Figure 3.2: IPSec AH Protocol Format

AH consists of five fixed-length fields and a variable length Authentication Data field.
Figure 3.3 shows the relative position of these fields in AH.
8

o

31

16

/

/
Next Header

Payload Length

R e s e rv e d

Security Param eter Index (SPI)
S e q u e n c e N u m b e r Field

/
/
/
/

Authentication Data (Hash Checksum)
—

/
/

Figure 3.3: Authentication Header Format

2. N ext H eader: This is an 8-bit field that identifies protocol ID of the transport
protocol that is included in the payload after the Authentication Header. The
protocol ID is a number that is chosen from a standard set of protocols ID defined
by IETF.
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3. Payload Length: This is an 8-bit field that specifies the length of AH in 32-bit
words.
4. Reserved: This 16-bit field is reserved for future use.
5. Security Param eters Index (SPI): SPI is a random 32-bit value that is used with
the destination IP address and security protocol (AH) to exclusively identify the
Security Association for each IP datagram.
6. Sequence Number tSNI: This unsigned 32-bit field contains a monotonically
increasing counter value that provides anti-replay security service against replay
attacks. For each IP packet issued for a specific SA, the sequence number is
incremented by one to guarantee that each IP packet is assigned a unique
sequence number. The receiver host verifies each IP packet to guarantee the SN
has not been reused. In this way, an attacker can not capture an IP packet, modify
its content, and play it back.
7. Authentication Data: This is a variable-length field that contains a hash or
Integrity Check Value (ICV) for each IP packet. It is produced by the sender host
to protect a packet from modification during transit. A recipient host performs the
same integrity check and compares the result of the hash algorithm with the result
stored in this field. There are several types of authentication algorithms, such as
MD5 and SHA-1. Each one produces different ICV values.

The AH protocol can be used when there is a need to protect the entire IP packet
from being modified. The AH protocol can also be used when communications
must be restricted to specific computers in a network. AH protocol ensures mutual
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authentication between communicating computers, such as trusted computers in a
domain. If a host can not negotiate an SA, communications do not take place.
In summary, the AH protocol provides data integrity for the entire IP packet by
using authentication algorithms such as MD5. It also provides data origin
authentication by using a shared secret key or the SPI. Finally, AH protocol
provides a mechanism against replay attack by using sequence numbers.

3.2.3

AH Modes

AH can be used in either transport or tunnel mode. The difference is the data being
protected, either an upper-layer protocol or an entire IP datagram. In either case, AH also
authenticates immutable portions of the outer IP header.
3.2.3.1 AH Transport Mode
When used in transport mode, AH protects end-to-end communication. The
communications endpoint must be the IPSec endpoint. The AH header is inserted into the
datagram to protect it by placing it immediately following the IP header (and any options)
and before the upper layer protocol to protect. Figure 3.4 shows the position of AH-in
transport mode relative to other header fields.
IPv4 header before applying AH
1 Variable length
Option field

Transport protocol
Header

Transport protocol
Data

IPv4 header after applying AH
Variable length
Option field

AH

Transport protocol
Header

Transport protocol
Data

Figure 3.4: AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode.

57

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The option field was eliminated in IPv6. The options, in this version of IP. are treated
as separate headers called extension headers that are inserted after the IP header. This
feature speeds up packet processing time in that, except for the hop-by-hop extension
header which contains routing information that routers need to examine, the extension
headers are not examined or processed by any intermediate node on the path from the
source to the destination. They are only processed by the destination host. In transport
mode for IPv6, the AH is inserted after the hop- by- hop, Routing and Fragmentation
extension headers. Figure 3.5 illustrates this.

IPv6 header before applying AH
O riginal IP h e a d e r E x te n sio n h e a d e r s T ra n sp o rt p ro to c o l T ra n sp o rt p ro to c o l
(If p re s e n t)
header
d a ta
I

IPv6 header after applying AH
O riginal IP h e a d e r

H op-by-H op, R o u tin g an d
F ra g m e n ta tio n h e a d e rs
(If p re s e n t)

AH

T ra n sp o rt p rotocol T ra n sp o rt p ro to c o l
header
d a ta

Figure 3.5: AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.

3.2.3.2 AH Tunnel Mode
When used in tunnel mode, AH encapsulates the protected datagram and an
additional IP header is added before the AH header. The “internal” IP datagram
contains the original addressing of the communication and the “outer” IP datagram
contains the addresses of the IPSec end-points. Tunnel mode can be used as a
replacement for transport mode for end-to-end security, but since there is no
confidentiality and therefore no protection against traffic analysis, there is really no
point in AH tunnel mode. AH is simply used to guarantee that the received packet

58

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was not modified in transit, that it was sent by the party claiming to have sent it, and
optionally, that it is a fresh, nonreplayed packet.

In tunnel mode, AH is inserted before the original IP header and a new IP header, is
consequently inserted in front of the AH. This is illustrated diagrammatically for IPv4
in Figure 3.6 and for IPv6 in Figure 3.7, respectively.
IPv4 header before applying AH
I Variable length
Option field

Transport protocol
Header

"ftansport protocol
Data

IPv4 header after applying AH
New IP header
AH
Option field

Original IP header Transport protocol Transport protocol
Option field
Data
Header

|

Figure 3.6: AH relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel mode

IPv6 header before applying AH
Original IP header Extension headers Transport prot;ocoi Transport protocol
(If present}
header
data

IPv6 header after applying AH
New IP
header

Extension
headers
(If present)

AH

Original IP
header

Extension
headers
(If present)

Transport
protocol
header

Transport
protocol
data

Figure 3.7: AH relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode

The inner IP header carries the true source (the node that generated the packet, and the
final destination address. Whereas, the outer IP header typically carries the sender’s
security gateway address as the source address, and the recipient’s security gateway
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address as the destination address. Consequently, the source address in the inner and
outer IP headers may be different. The same holds for the destination address.
3.2.4 AH Processing
When an outbound packet matches an SPDB entry denoting protection with AH, the
SADB is queried to see whether a suitable SA exists. If there is no SA, IKE can be used
to dynamically create one. If there is an SA, AH is applied to the matched packet in the
mode dictated by the SPDB entry. If there is an SPDB bundle, the order of application
depends on the protocols involved. AH always protects ESP, not the other way around.
3.2.4.1 O utbound Processing
When an IPSec implementation receives an outbound packet it uses the relevant
selectors (destination IP address and port, transport protocol, etc) to search the
Security Policy Database (SPDB) to ascertain the policy that is applicable to the
traffic. If IPSec processing is required and a SA or SA bundle has already been
established, the SPDB entry that matches the selectors in the packet will point to the
appropriate SA bundle in the SADB. If a SA has not been established, the IPSec
implementation will create a SA and link it to the SPDB entry. The SA is then used to
process the packet as follows:
1. Generate or increment Sequence Number as the sequence number is used to
prevent replay of previously transmitted packets. When a new SA is
established the sender initializes its sequence number counter to zero. For
each packet that the sender transmits, it increases the sequence number by one
and insert the resulting value of the sequence number counter into the
sequence number field of the AH header.
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2. Calculate Integrity Check Value. The ICV is calculated using the values in the
immutable fields of the IP header and the values of the mutable fields that are
predictable mutable fields for the purpose of the ICV computation. The SA for
the datagram stipulates the cryptographic authentication algorithm that should
be used to generate the ICV. The available choices of authentication
algorithms vary with different IPSec implementations. The ICV is generated
into the variable length Authentication Data field of the AH, then if required,
the datagram is fragmented into the appropriate fragment size and sent to the
destination node.
3.2.4.2 Inbound Processing
When a datagram arrives at an IPSec host or security gateway, if the more fragment
bit is set, this is an indication that there are other fragments that are yet to arrive. The
IPSec application therefore waits until a fragment arrives with a sequence number
that is similar to the previous ones, and has the more fragment bit not set. It then
reassembles the IP fragments, then performs the following steps:

1. It uses the SPI, destination IP address and IPSec protocol in the IP header
(outer IP header if tunnel mode) to look up the SA for this datagram in the
inbound SADB. If the look up fails, it drops the packet and logs the error.
2. It uses the SA found in (1) to do the IPSec processing. This involves first
checking to determine whether the selectors in the IP headers (inner header if
tunnel mode) match those in the SA. If the selectors do not match, the
application drops the packet and audits the error. If the selectors match, the
IPSec application keeps track of the SA and the order in which it is applied
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relative to the others and continues to do (1) and (2) until it encounters a nonIP Sec extension header or a transport layer protocol.
3. It uses the selectors in the packet to find a policy in the inbound SPD whose
selectors match those of the packet.
4. It checks whether the SA’s found in (1) and (2) match the policy specified in
(3). If the check fails, repeat steps (4) and (5) until all policy entries have been
check or until the check succeeds.
5. If anti-replay is enabled use the anti-replay window of the SA to determine if
the packet is a replay. If the packet is a replay, drop it and log the error.
6. It uses the authentication algorithm specified by the SA bundle to calculate the
ICV for the packet and compares it with the value stored in the Authentication
Data field. If the two values differ, then it discards the packet and audit the
error.
At the end of these steps, if the packet has not been discarded, it is passed to the
transport layer protocol, or is forwarded.
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3.3 The IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) Protocol

3.3.1

Encapsulating Security Pavload (ESP) Protocol Concept
The ESP protocol can be used to guarantee one or any combination of the
following security services [4]:

1. Data confidentiality - It guarantees that only the sender and the receiver are able
to read user data. All intermediate nodes that are on the path can not read user
data while in transit. This is accomplished by using a specific data encryption
algorithm in the source and destination hosts with a secure key distribution
mechanism.
2. Partial protection against traffic analysis - This service is only available in the
tunnel mode of ESP protocol where the actual source and destination IP addresses
are hidden. Only the source and destination IP addresses of the security gateways
are exposed on the IP packet. An attacker in the middle can only see an IP packet
that is going from one security gateway to another one without knowing the actual
sender and receiver hosts.
3. AH Security Services
All the AH services,

connectionless data integrity, data origin

authentication, and protection against replay, can also be enabled in ESP
protocol.
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3.3.2

ESP Protocol Format
Figure 3.8 shows IPSec ESP protocol format in both transport and tunnel modes.
The confidentiality security service can be activated alone or with other services.
Allowing confidentiality without other services makes traffic vulnerable to certain
types of active attacks [25].
original IPv4 p a ck e t
original
IP header

TCP/UDP
header

ESP In Transport Mode____________________ ESP In TUnnel Mode
original
IP header

ESP
header

TCP/UDP
header -

data

IWW
IP header

ESP
ESP
Trailer Auth

original
IP li«ailt'

TCPAJDP
header

data

ESP ' ESP
Trailer Auth

encrypted

encrypted
'"authenticated
Security
P a ra m e te r index

ESP
header

a u th e n tic a te d ^ - '-

Sequence

Padding

| N um ber

P adding
Length

N ext H e ad er
(TC P/U D P)

Figure 3.8: IPSec ESP Protocol Format

Similar to AH protocol, authentication and integrity are enabled together and
provided by the use of an ICV or hash value. Protection against replay attacks is
achieved by the use of a sequence number which the receiver uses to check every
incoming packet. ESP protocol provides integrity service by signing the ESP header,
TCP/UDP header user data, and the ESP trailer. It also prevents IP packets from
inspection by encrypting the TCP/UDP header, user data, and the ESP trailer.
AH and ESP protocols can be combined together in the same SA. While both AH
and ESP provide integrity protection for user data, AH protects the entire IP packet
from modification while ESP protocol protects only the TCP/UDP header and user
data from inspection through encryption.
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ESP packets consist of four fixed-length fields and 3 variable-length fields. Figure 3.9
shows the packet format of this protocol. A brief description of each field is as
follows.
le

24

31

S e c u rity P a r a m e te r s In d e x (S P I)
S equence N um ber

P.iyin.id D ata (V a ria b le)

{0 - 2 5 5 b y t e ,)
P.m! L en g th

N ext liertfb-!

A u th e n tic a tio n D a ta (Variable)

Figure 3.9: ESP Packet Format.

1. Security Param eter Index (SPI) - The SPI is a 32-bit integer that is used in
combination with the source or destination address and the IPSec protocol to
uniquely identify the SA for the datagram. The range of numbers from 1 to 255
are reserved by the Internet Assigned Number Authority (IANA) for future use,
and 0 is reserved for local and implementation specific use. Therefore the current
valid SPI values are between 256 and 2 - 1 inclusively. This is similar to the AH
SPI field.
2. Sequence Number (SN) - As is the case for the AH, this contains a 32-bit
unsigned integer which servers as a monotonically increasing counter. The
sender’s and receiver’s sequence number counters are initialized to 0 when the SA
is established. The sender consequently increases its sequence number by one for
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every packet it sends using a given SA. The sequence number is used to prevent
intruders from capturing and re-sending previously transmitted datagrams.
3. Payload Data - This field contains the padding bits, if any, that are utilized by the
encryption algorithm, or that are used to align the pad Length field so that it
begins at the third byte within the 4-byte word. The length of this field can be
between 0 and 255 bytes inclusively.
4. Pad Length - The Pad Length field is a 8 -bit field which indicates the number of
padding bytes in the Padding field. The valid values for this field are integers
between 0 and 255 inclusively.
5. Next H eader - This is a 8-bit field that identifies the type of data encapsulated in
the payload. It may indicate an IPv6 extension header or a transport layer
protocol; refer to [47] for the set of assigned IP protocol numbers.
6 . Authentication Data - This is a variable-length field that contains the Integrity

Check Value (ICV), which as indicated by Figure 3.14, is calculated over the
length of the ESP packet minus the Authentication data field. The length of this
field is specified by the authentication algorithm employed for the authentication.

3.3.3 ESP Modes
The ESP protocol is used when there is a need to protect user data and the
TCP/UDP header from being observed. The ESP protocol is also used to protect
the TCP/UDP header and application data from modification during transmission.
In summary, the ESP protocol provides confidentiality for user data in each IP
packet. It also provides partial protection against traffic analysis when it is used in

66

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the tunnel mode. Finally, ESP protocols provides data integrity where only the
user data and TCP/UDP header are authenticated, compared to the authentication
of the entire IP packet in AH protocol as shown in Figure 3.8 and 3.14.

As is the case for AH, the location of the ESP data in the packet depends on the
mode of operation of ESP. There are two modes of operation: transport mode and
tunnel mode. These modes of operation will be discussed in the following two
subsections.
3.3.3.1 ESP Transport Mode
In transport mode, the ESP header is inserted after the IP header and any
options it contains but before any transport layer protocol, or before any
IPSec protocol that has already been applied, as illustrated in Figure 3.10.

O riginal IP d a ta g ra m
IP lie a d e i

o tlie i h e a u e i s a n d p a y lo a d s

Encry

Is h e a a e i

ESP header

o th e i h e a d e r s a n a p a y io a d s

E S P tia lle r

IP datagram with transport ESP

Figure 3.10: IP Datagram with Transport ESP Mode

So, for IPv4 in transport mode, ESP is inserted after the variable length
options “filed show in field, Figure 3.11.
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IPv4 header before applying ESP
Variable length
Option field

Transport protocol
Header

Transport protocol
Data

1
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IPv4 h e a d e r a fte r applying ESP

Variable length ESP Transport protocol Transport protocol ESP
Trailer
Header
Option field Header
■ Data

ESP Authentication
Data

<----------------Encrypted-------------------------- }
k ------------------------- A uthenticated--------------------------*

Figure 3.11: ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in transport mode.

Figure 3.11 shows the position of ESP in transport mode relative to other
header fields. In this diagram, the ESP Header field consists of the SPI and
Sequence number fields’ whereas the ESP Trailer authentication services
are applied as shown in Figure 3.12. In transport mode, for IPv6 , the ESP
header is inserted after the Hop-by-Hop. Routing and Fragmentation
extension headers .Figure 3.16 illustrates this.

IPv6 header before applying ESP
O riginal IP h e a d e r E x te n s io n h e a d e r s T r a n s p o r t p ro to c o l T r a n s p o r t p ro to c o l
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d a ta
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header
D ata
|
(If p re s e n t)

---- *1

4------------------ E n c ry p te d ----------------------k --------- ----------------- A u th e n tic a te d --------------------—

#

Figure 3.12: ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in transport mode.

o 3.3.3.2 ESP Tunnel Mode
In tunnel mode, ESP is inserted before the original IP header and a new IP
header is consequently inserted in front of the ESP header. This is
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illustrated in Figure 3.13 for IPv4 and for IPv6 in Figure 3.14,
respectively.
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ESP relative to other IPv4 header fields, in tunnel mode.
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Figure 3.14: ESP relative to other IPv6 extension headers, in tunnel mode

The inner IP header carries the true source (the node that generated the
packet) and the final destination address. The outer IP header typically
carries the sender’s security gateway address as the source address, and
the recipient’s security gateway address as the destination address.

Consequently, the source address in the inner and outer IP headers may be
different; the same holds for the destination address.

69

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

3.3.4 ESP Processing
Processing of an IP packet with ESP depends partly on the mode in which ESP is being
employed. In either case, though, one thing to remember is that with ESP, the ciphertext is
authenticated.

3.3.4.1 Outbound Processing
When an IPSec implementation receives an outbound packet it uses the relevant
selectors (destination IP address and port, transport protocol, etc) to search the
security Policy Database (SPDB) to ascertain what policy is applicable to the
traffic. If IPSec processing is required and a SA or SA bundle has already been
established, the SPDB entry that matches the selectors in the packet will point to
the appropriate SA bundle in the SADB. If a SA has not been established, the IPSec
implementation will create a SA and link it to the SPDB entry. The SA is then used
to process the packet as follows:
1. Generate or Increment Sequence Number - The sequence number is used
to prevent replay of previously transmitted packets. When a new SA is
established the sender initializes its sequence number counter to zero. For
each packet that the sender transmits, it increases the sequence number by one
and insert the resulted value of the sequence number counter into the sequence
number field of the ESP packet.
2. Encrypt the Packet - If the traffic requires confidentiality services the SA
will specify the encryption algorithm to be used. The available choices of
encryption algorithms depends on the IPSec implementation. However, only
private-key cryptosystems are currently used because of the slow execution
speed of public key cryptosystems compared to private-key enciphering
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systems, as discussed in Chapter 1. For interoperability, all IPSec
implementations must provide DES in CBC mode as an encryption algorithm
option. When the encryption algorithm requires an Initial Vector(IV) as is the
case with DES in CBC mode, the IV is carried in the first few bytes of the
Payload Data field. As illustrated in Figures 3.14, the ESP header, the SPI
(Security parameter index) and the Sequence number, are not encrypted. This
is so because the destination node needs the SPI to look up the SA of the
packet, and it requires the Sequence Number to ascertain whether or not the
packet is a re-play of a previously transmitted packet. The authentication data
is similarly not encrypted because the receiving node must authenticate the
packet before it decrypts it. This will be discussed further in the discussion of
ESP Inbound Processing. When encryption service is required the packet must
be encrypted before the calculation of the ICV.
3. Calculate the Integrity Check Value - If the SA for the packet stipulates that
ESP authentication service should be applied, the ICV is calculated using the
values in all the fields of the ESP packet except the Authentication Data field,
then the ICV is inserted in the Authentication Data field. The SA for the
packet specifies the algorithm that should be used to generate ICV. The
available choices of authentication algorithms vary with different IPSec
implementation. However, for interoperability, all implementations are
required to support HMAC with MD5, and HMAC with SHA-1. If
fragmentation is required, the packet is broken into the appropriate sizes then
sent on route to the destination node.
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3.3.4.2 Inbound Processing
When a packet arrives at an IPSec host or security gateway, if the more fragment bit
is set, this is an indication that there are other fragments that are yet to arrive. The
IPSec application therefore waits until a fragment arrives with a sequence number
that is similar to the previous ones, and has the more fragment bit not set. It then
reassembles the IP fragments, then performs the following steps:
1. Use the destination IP address and IPSec protocol in the IP header (outer IP
header if tunnel mode), and the SPI in the ESP header to look up the SA for the
packet in the inbound SADB. If the lookup fails, it drops the packet and logs the
error.
2. Use the SA found in (1) to process the ESP packet. This involves first checking to
determine whether the selectors in the IP headers (inner header if tunnel mode)
match those in the SA. If the selectors do not match, the application drops the
packet and audit the error. If the selectors match, the IPSec application keeps
track of the SA and the order in which it is applied relative to the others, and
continues to do (1) and (2) until it encounters a non-IPSec extension header or a
transport layer protocol.
3. Use the selectors in the packet to find a policy in the inbound SPD whose
selectors match those of the packet.
4. Check whether the SAs found in (1) and (2) match the policy specified in (3). If
the check fails, repeat steps(4) and (5) until all policy entries have been check or
until the check succeeds.
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5. If anti-replay is enabled, use the anti-replay window of the SA or SA bundle to
determine if the packet is a replay. If the packet is a replay, drop it and log the
error.
6 . If the SA stipulates that authentication service is required, then uses the

authentication algorithm and the private-key specified by the SA bundle to
calculate the ICV for the packet and compares it with the value stored in the ESP
Authentication Data field. If the two values differs, then discard the packet and
audit the error.
7. If the SA indicates the application of confidentiality service use the cryptographic
algorithm and the private-key that the SA specifies to decrypt the packet.
Decryption processes are in general quite CPU and memory intensive. If the
IPSec system is allowed to perform unnecessary decryption or encryption of
packets, then the system will be vulnerable to denial of service attack.
Consequently, when decryption or encryption is required, this service is applied
after the packet has been successfully authenticated.
At the end of these steps if the packet has not been discarded, it is then passed to the
transport layer protocol, or is forwarded.
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3.4 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Protocol

3.4.1 IKE Protocol Concept
Prior to an IP packet being secured by IPSec , a security association (SA) must exist. As
stated earlier, SAs may be created manually or dynamically. The Internet Key Exchange
(IKE) is used to create them dynamically. IKE negotiates SAs on behalf of IPSec and
populates the SADB.
IKE, described in [40], is a hybrid protocol. It is based on a framework defined by
the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP), defined in
[41], and implements parts of two key management protocols, Oakley and SKEME [37].
In addition IKE defines two exchanges of its own.
o ISAKMP was developed by researchers at the National Security Agency (NSA)
[41], The NSA used to be a super secret organization whose existence was denied
by the United States government. Recently, the NSA has come out of the shadows
and its considerable expertise in cryptography and security has been put to visible
use. ISAKMP is one such output,
o Oakley is a protocol developed by Hilarie Orman, a cryptographer from the
University of Arizona [42], It is a free-form protocol that allows each party to
advance the state of the protocol at is own speed. From Oakley, IKE borrowed the
idea of different modes, each party producing a similar result; an authenticated
key exchange through the exchange of information at different speeds. In Oakley,
there was no definition of information required to exchange with each message.
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The modes were examples of how Oakley could be utilized to achieve a secure key
exchange. IKE codified the modes into exchanges. By narrowing the flexibility of the
Oakley model, IKE limits the wide range of possibilities that Oakley allows yet still
provides multiple modes, albeit in a well-defined manner.
o SKEME is another key exchange protocol, designed by cryptographer Hugo
Krawczyk [50], SKEME defines a type of authenticated key exchange in which
the parties use public key encryption to authenticate each other and “share”
components of the exchange. Each side encrypts a random number in the public
key of the peer and both random numbers (after decryption) contribute to the
ultimate key. One can optionally do a Diffie-Hellman exchange along with the
SKEME share technique for Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), or merely use
another rapid exchange, which does not require public key operations, to refresh
an existing key. IKE borrows this technique directly from SKEME for one of its
authentication methods (authentication with public key encryption) and also
borrows the notion of rapid key refreshment without PFS.

It is upon these three protocols ISAKMP, Oakley, and SKEME that IKE is based. It is a
hybrid protocol: it uses the foundation of ISAKMP, the modes of Oakley, and the share
and rekeying techniques of SKEME to define its own unique way of deriving
authenticated keying material and negotiating shared policy, as is demonstrated in Figure
3.15. The contributions of Oakley and SKEME can be seen in the discussion of IKE
itself, but the contributions of ISAKMP are sufficiently considerable to warrant a
separate discussion.
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secure IKE negotiations

Exchange certificates/signatures

Figure 3.15: IKE parameters

3.4.2 ISAKMP
ISAKMP defines how two peers communicate, how the messages they use to
communicate are constructed, and also defines the state transitions they go through to
secure their communication. It provides the means to authenticate a peer, to exchange
information for a key exchange, and to negotiate security services.
ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats to negotiate, establish, modify and
delete SAs.

ISAKMP provides a common framework for the format of SA attributes and the
methodologies for negotiating, modifying and deleting SAs that different key
exchange protocols can use. ISAKMP defines several payloads. These payloads
provides modular building block for constructing ISAKMP messages. The ISAKMP
header format and the Generic Payload header as well as the various payloads that
IKE uses are given in Appendix A4 for interested reader.
It must be noted that IKE uses a variety of payloads as listed below:

76

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1) Security Association Payload
2) Proposed Association Payload
3) Transform Association Payload
4) Key Exchange Association Payload
5) Identification Payload
6 ) Certificate Payload

7) Hash Payload
8) Signature Payload

9) Source Payload
For a description and format of the above payload consult the Appendix A4.

o Message Format
The ISAKMP specification has a complete description of payload formats and
payload specific attributes.
Payloads are chained together in a message by using the next payload field in the
generic header (see Figure 3.16). The ISAKMP header describes the first payload
following the header, and each payload describes which payload comes next. The last
payload in the message is zero.*

*

ISAKMP communication is done via UDP port 500. Other port protocol combinations are

possible, but UDP port 500 has been reserved by IANA (Internet Assigned Number
Authority) for ISAKMP and all ISAKMP implementations are required to support
communication over UDP port 500.
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3.4.3 Exchanges and Phases
ISAKMP describes two separate phases of negotiation. In the first phase, peers establish
an authenticated and secure channel between themselves. In the second phase, the
authenticated and secure channel is used to negotiate security services for a different
protocol such as IPSec.

3.4.3.1 Exchange Phases
IKE presents different exchanges in modes which operate in one of two ISAKMP
negotiation phases:
(1) Phase 1 Negotiation
In this phase, two ISAKMP communicating peers establish an
ISAKMP SA which essentially is an agreement on how further
negotiation traffic between the peers will be protected. This
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ISAKMP SA is then used to protect the negotiation of SAs for
other protocols, such as ESP or AH.
(2) Phase 2 Negotiation
This phase is used to establish SAs for other security services, such
as AH or ESP. A single Phase 1 SA can be used to establish many
Phase 2 SAs.
3.4.3.2 Exchange Modes
1. IKE currently defines four possible modes of exchange: Main Mode,
Aggressive Mode, Quick Mode and New Group Mode. The first three
negotiate SAs: whereas in the latter Transform Payload(s) encapsulated in
Proposal Payload(s) which is/are encapsulated in Security Association
Payload(s). These exchange modes will be discussed briefly in the subsequent
subsection.
1. Main Mode
Main Mode is an adaptation of the ISAKMP “Identity Protection
Exchange”. It involves an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key exchange. It
is used to negotiate Phase 1 ISAKMP SA. This exchange mode was
designed to separate key exchange information from the identity and
authentication information. The separation of these information provides
protection for the identity of the communicating peers since the identity
information can be exchanged under the protection of the previously
generated Diffie-Hellman shared secret at the expense of two or three
additional messages. Figure 3.17 shows an example of a Main Mode
exchange.
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Figure 3.17: Example of a Main Mode Exchange

2. Aggressive Mode
Aggressive Mode is an implementation of ISAKMP “Aggressive Mode
Exchange” it is used to negotiate ISAKMP Phase 1 SA where identity
protection of the communicating peers is not required. This exchange
mode allow the SA, Key Exchange and Authentication related payloads to
be transmitted together. Combining these payloads into one message
reduces the number of round-trips at the expense of not providing
protection of the identity of the communicating peers. Figure 3.18 shows
an example of an Aggressive Mode exchange.

IKE SA - Aggressive Mode (phase 1)^
Responder

Initiator

(.U[ nUrv | on

j fvfc j

Ni

(2)

p.

Figure 3.18: Example of an Aggressive Mode Exchange.
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3. Quick Mode
Quick mode is used to negotiate phase 2 SA under the protection of the
negotiated Phase 1 ISAKMP SA. All of the payloads in a Quick Mode
exchange are encrypted. Figure 3.19 shows an example of a Quick Mode
exchange.

Quick Mode (phase 2)
R esoonder

Initiator
wrs>

ISAKMP SA (phase 1)

C D f S P I HDR*|HASH{1)|SA|Ni|KE|lDi|IDrp»

(2 )

(3)

HDR*[HASH(2)|SA|NrjKE[lDillDr]C !

HDR*|HASH(3)|l

Figure 3.19 Example of a Quick Mode exchange.

4. New Group Mode
The New Group Mode (NGM) is used to negotiate new group for DiffieHellman key exchange. NGM is carried out under the protection of ISAKMP
phase 1 exchange.

3.4.4 Oakley Groups
The IKE protocol allows negotiation of the group for Diffie-Hellman exchange. The
original specification of IKE defined four groups that originated from the Oakley
Protocol. These groups are presented below.

81

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV: A FRAMEWORK FOR IPSEC FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE

4.1 Introduction
IPSec provides the essential components to codify on IP-based Virtual Private
Network (VPN) infrastructure [42]. Widespread implementation is likely because o f
the security required in Internet communications. IPSec as described in Chapters II
and III is composed o f a number o f different pieces that makes its one-piece
implementation extremely difficult, if not impossible.

The major issues in

implementing IPSec are: 1) performance, 2) applicability to different operation
environment that have special requirements, 3) integration with network management
systems, 4) expandability to adapt to network changes, enhancements, and new
policies, and finally 5) modular implementation that can easily be modified.
Although, IPSec enabled routers and gateways has been available commercially by
venders such as Lucent IPSec* VPN, Cisco IOS IPSec/SSL* VPN, and Nortel* VPN
router, no clear functional design and/or architecture for realization o f IPSec system
is supplied in the literature.

* Lucent IPSec Virtual Private Network: A Technical Review, White paper, 2001
* IPSec Features in Cisco IOS Software Releases 12.3T, 12.3, and 12.2T, White paper, Sept. 2004.
*Nortel VPN Router Portfolio
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Free S/WAN IPSec is a freely available commercial off-the-shelf implementation of
IPSec, which is installed in all Linux gateways.

This implementation lacks some

functionality. In practice, integrating network management, routing, QoS, and security
requires the interoperability o f IPSec and key management over multiple platform (e.g.
Cisco, Microsoft Windows 2000, and Red Hat Linux).

Keromytis, etal implemented

IPSec protocols for BSD/OS, Linux, OpenBSD, and NetBSD operating environment.[46]
This implementation includes only kernel patches for processing incoming and outgoing
IP datagrams, maintaining the database and policy table as well as a set o f tools for
configuring the policy table. In R ef [47], the authors propose an IPSec implementation
on Xilinx Virtex II Pro FPGA. However, this can implement only some functions o f
IPSec features, and is based on processing the IPSec inbound and outbound traffic using
FPGAs.

R ef [48] proposes an FPGA-based adaptive cryptographic engine for IPSec

architectures, and focuses on the encryption/decryption aspects only.
With security service proliferation, and as authentication and encryption algorithms
become stronger, so does IPSec. It is important to note that IPSec is only as strong as the
methods chosen for its implementation.
We are now in a position to propose a framework on a layered security functional
architecture to implement the IPSec full range o f functionality for enterprise networks.
The proposed functional architecture is modular and makes it possible to compose IPSec
software applications from products developed by different supplies at different times.
The design requirements and specifications for the accompanying Security Management
Information Base (SMIB) is describe in Sec.4.3.
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4.2 IPSec Functional Architecture
IPSec provides security services at IP layer (Network layer) by enabling a system to
select required security mechanisms, determine the algorithms to use for the services,
and put in place any cryptographic keys required to provide the requested services.
We propose structuring the IPSec functionality based on the framework of the logical
security management system and method, as described in [44]. In this architecture
basic functionality of IPSec is organized in logical function layers. The basic IPSec
data is stored and managed by an IP security management information base
(IPSMIB). The developed architecture, shown in Fig.4.1,
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Figure 4.1: IPSec functional five logical layers.
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implements IPSec functionality through five logical layers. Each layer has a modular
architecture and is made of one or several “modules”. Modules use the services of an
infrastructure of independent lowerlayer functions to support their own offered
functions and to communicate among themselves. It is seen that IPSec physical
realization requires multiple modules at each layer. The five functional layers of
IPSec are described in the following subsections.
4.2.1 - IPSec Policy & Business Management Function layer
4.2.1.1 - IPSec Policy Concepts
A policy defines a definite goal, course, or method of action to guide and
determine present and future decisions. In the context of IPSec management, it
can be seen that an IPSec policy consists of rules for providing security protection
to IP traffic. As an example, a policy may call for all traffic originated from a
given IP address to be protected by AH in tunnel mode using an integrity
protection service based on the key hashing algorithm SHA-1.
A complicated IPSec policy may include multiple nested SAs.
a) Policy Definition Requirement
The design for a policy definition and management system must not
constrain the richness of IPSec. Therefore, there are several requirements
imposed on any policy system. These requirements are very high level
because there is no single mechanism for policy definition and
management.

Different IPSec

implementation will have different

requirement. These are not all the requirements set of policy but merely a
large set that any system will be abide by:
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o Ability to configure multiple policies per host,
o Ability to configure policy per network,
o Ability to configure security at the granularity of an application,
o Ability to specify multiple protocols per flow,
o

Ability to

specify the desired action for each flow,

o

Ability to configure tunnels of more than one level deep (nested
tunnel)

o Ability to supply different IKE identities for access and
authentication.
o

Ability toselectively disable automated key management,

o

Ability to

support multiple security options,

b) Policy representation
Policy representation involves two aspects. The physical representation defining the format in which the policy is represented, where it is stored,
how it is updated, modified, and what protocols are used to update the
policy;
o The interface representation - defining how the various IPSec
components acquire and manage a policy.
Figure 4.2 shows the most popular paradigm that currently exists for
policy configuration and distribution.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

IPScc
Polk?
(IPSMIB Segment) ^

Domain

Figure 4.2: Policy deployment architecture.

The policy is stored centrally in a policy server. The policy server is
responsible for maintaining the policy for all nodes (host and router) in the
domain. The policy server provides the capability to configure security for
all the nodes. The policy is either downloaded into the various nodes in the
network or is fetched dynamically by the nodes using directory services
protocol such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol).

c) Policy management
Policy management defines the following interfaces:
o Interface between the directory service and the IPSec Policy
database located in IPSMIB segments;
o Interface between the User Interface application and the local
policy database that allows read, write, and modify access to the
database;
o

Interface between IKE and policy database;

o Interface between kernel and the policy database.
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4.2.1.2-

IPSec Policy Management Function layer

This is the upper most functions in implementing IPSec in an enterprise
environment. This function determines the general goals and policy for each
security service implemented through IPSec, as set by the corporation’s security
vision. The current IPSec specifications don’t identify any function in this layer.
This policy management layer significantly simplifies the task of defining,
deploying, and maintaining security policies across a network, therely
significantly simplifying layer-scale IPSec deployment. In addition, the IPSecc
Policy Management function can include the following functions: are as follows:
d) Prevention and detection of IPSec security violation - A set of rules can be
Implemented in a rule - based system to detect intrusion by observing IPSec
events and making a decision whether a given IPSec pattern of activities is
suspicious.
e) Network wide IPSec implementation policy - Once this layer is in place,
multiple IP security policy requirements can be accessed to support the many
aspects of IPSec security across the enterprise network.
f) Disaster Recovery

Figure 4.3: IPSec Policy and Business Management function Layer.

Currently, separate Policy-based IPSec management systems are employed to manage a
network as a whole.
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4.2.2 IPSec Management Function Layer
The IPSec security management function layer provides a completely integrated and
centralized management option for IPSec implementation. This function will support
multiple IPSec security services, VPN, and QoS with one effective configuration. This
layer is concerned with security aspects which are outside normal scope of IPSec security
services, but which are needed to support and control IPSec security services and
mechanisms. The IPSec security management function, in general, are as follows:
a)

Policy Control and management of security services - A set of securityrelated parameters and information to provision and control IPSec security
services for centrally provisioned and managed for large - scale IPSec
networks.

b)

Event Logging - A function that maintains logs of connection attempts and
traffic flow, including detailed IKE and IPSec negotiation.

c)

IPSec services monitoring - A group of software functions to monitor IPSec
tunnels activity, and can provide continuous traffic statistics (in real - time).

d)

User Interface - A set of functions to manage the IPSec GUI (Graphical User
Interface) and provide online help search capabilities.

e)

Interoperability - A set of functions needed if the IPSec server is required to
exchange network management information automatically with other network
IP servers and IPSec servers. Note that not all IPSec management features are
currently available with IP services routers.

f)

Recovery and Backup - A set of functions for key and security state recovery
in case of security breaches and backup software based on IPSec event log
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massages. These tasks may be implemented monolithically or as individual
software modules.
In addition to the above functions, this layer can include a module that implements the
task of performing online secure upgrades of the modules in the lower layers of the
architecture. The IPSec security management function layer is shown in Figure4.4 below.

Figure 4.4: IPSec Security Management Layer

4.2.3 - IPSec Security Services Layer
The services provided by IPSec are implemented through modules in the security
services layer of the proposed architecture. These services are as follows [48]:
1. Access control
2. Integrity
3. Authentication
4. Confidentiality (encryption) and privacy (limited traffic flow confidentiality)
5. Rejection of replayed packets
This layer is illustrated in Figure 4.5 below.

Figure 4.5: IPSec Security Services Layer
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As per the IPSec specification, these services are provided by two protocols, namely
Authentication Header (AH) [49] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [25]. The
services provided by each protocol are shown in Table 1 below [8], Note that ESP can be
applied in two manners: with and without authentication.
Table 4.1: Security Services Provided by AH and ESP

AH
Access control
Inbegrity
Authentication
Confidentiality
Privacy
Rejection -of replayed
packets

ESP
(encryption only)
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y

ESP
(encryption, and
authentication)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

4.2.4 - IPSec security Mechanism Layer
In some literature, \security services" and \security mechanisms" are interchangeable.
In the proposed architecture we make a clear distinction between services and
mechanisms, with a service in the previous layer implementing one or more mechanisms
in this layer. The manner in which mechanisms are used to implement the security
services is dependent on the specific IPSec implementation [37].
The security mechanism layer is composed of stand-alone modules that are needed to
support the IPSec security services. Of the IPSec security services in use, cryptographic
techniques form the majority [43].
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The IPSec security mechanisms can be divided into five groups:
1. Encryption: Symmetric encryption techniques are used to provide confidentiality,
while public-key encryption techniques are used in authentication, certificates, and key
management mechanisms.
2. Message authentication: Hashed Message Authentication Codes (HMACs) [5] are
used to provide authentication and data integrity [43].
3. Key management: The key management mechanism involves the determination and
distribution of secret keys. Two types of key management are required as per the IPSec
specification: manual key management where a system is manually configured with its
own keys and the keys of any communicating systems, and automated key management
where keys are generated on-demand [48]. The default automated key management
protocol for IPSec is Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol
(ISAKMP)/Oakley [46]. ISAKMP provides the framework for key management, while
Oakley is a secure adaptation of the Diffe-Hellman key exchange algorithm [46].
ISAKMP does not specifically dictate a key exchange algorithm; Oakley is the key
exchange algorithm that was required for use with the first version of ISAKMP [43].
Other key exchange algorithms may be used, such as RSA [41] or Diffe-Hellman.
4. Certificates: Public-key certificates are used by key management services. The types of
certificates or certificate related information may include [43]: PGP certificates, Kerberos
tokens, X.509 certificates, DNS signed of keys, and SPKI certificates.
5. Digital signatures: Digital signatures are used in certificates to verify the authenticity
the certificate and the identity of the entity using the certificate. DSS [12] or RSA may be
used. These mechanisms are illustrated in Figure 4.6 below.
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Figure 4.6: IPSec Security Mechanisms Layer

4.2.5 —IPSec Primitive Function Layer
The lowest layer of the proposed architecture consists of the mathematical operations
and algorithms required by the security mechanisms in the previous layer [7].
We propose the implementation of each primitive mathematical module as one or
more atomic functions; that is, each function is self-contained, with its performance not
affecting any of the other functions in that module.
The rudimentary mathematical functions required by the services and mechanisms of
IPSec can be divided into five groups:
1. Prime number generation: Some IPSec mechanisms, such key management, require
the selection of one or more very large prime numbers at random; thus, the prime number
generation module must contain functions to generate these numbers. At present there are
no computationally simple techniques that definitively yield arbitrarily large primes; the
procedure that is used is to generate at random, using a pseudo random number generator,
an odd number of the desired order of magnitude, and then test whether this number is
prime. A variety of tests and algorithms for primality have been developed; one of the
more efficient and popular algorithms in use is the Miller-Rabin algorithm [32],
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2. Modular arithmetic: The modular arithmetic module should contain functions for
modular multiplication, multiplicative inverse, fast exponentiation, Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT), and discrete logarithms.
3. Encryption fundamentals'. The current specification of IPSec indicates that DES in
cipher block chaining (CBC) mode must be supported for symmetric encryption [43];
however, other algorithms may be used for symmetric encryption, such as: three-key
triple DES [15], RC5 [16, 17], IDEA [18], three-key triple IDEA [15], CAST [19], and
Blowfish [20, 21],
4. One-way hash codes: The authentication mechanisms that must be supported in an
IPSec implementation are HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-1-96 [43]; both use the first
96 bits of the value returned by the Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
algorithm [5] using either the MD5 [10] or SHA-1 [23] hash codes.
5. Elliptic curve arithmetic: The elliptic curve arithmetic library contains the algorithms
required to perform elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Presently ECC is not used in
IPSec implementations, but it is anticipated that it will be used in the future.
The modules in this layer are depicted in Figure 4.7 below.
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4.3 IPSec Protocol Handling Function
The current IPSec specification employs three protocols:
1. Authentication Header (AH) [3]
2. Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [4]
3. Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) [5]
Handling these protocols for both transport mode and tunnel mode in an IPSec
network requires accessibility to the modules in the layers of the proposed architecture.
To effectively realize IPSec, we proposed the implementation an \IPSec Protocol
Handling Function" as shown previously in Figure 1. The IPSec protocol handling
function performs these two overall functions:
1. For outgoing data, it interfaces with the layers to perform the necessary
processing into IPSec packets, and then passes the packets to the operating
system of the system on which IPSec is realized for transmission over the
network.
2. It accepts incoming IPSec packets from the operating system, extracts the data,
and passes the data on to the appropriate IPSec layer for processing into data
usable by the system on which IPSec is implemented.
In a typical protocol handling process for IPSec we need a dispatcher and a message
processing unit (MPU), as depicted in Figure 4.8 below. For outgoing packets, the
dispatcher accepts outgoing data from the system, determines what protocol needs to be
applied to the data and passes it on to the appropriate MPU. The MPU prepares the data
for transmission by interfacing with the modules in the layers, wrapping the data in the
appropriate IPSec header, and then returning the data to the dispatcher, which then
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dispatches it to the operating system for transmission. The reverse process is carried out
for incoming messages.

Figure4.8: IPSec Protocol Handling Function

4.4. IPSec Security Management Information Base (IPSec SMIB)
Security services applied to IP traffic between a sender and a receiver are defined by
a security association (SA). The SA is defined for one direction only; if a two-way
relationship is required, then two SAs are required. In each IPSec implementation there is
a security management information base (SMIB) that defines and manages the
parameters associated with each security association (SA). Multiple SMIB entries may
relate to a single SA, or one SMIB entry may relate to multiple SAs [43]. The SMIB is
divided into segments, one segment for use by each IPSec functional layer. Content or
form for the storage, implementation, or usage of information is not explicitly defined
since it is highly dependent on the specifics of each individual IPSec implementation
[37].
Parameters that define a SA are [43]: sequence number counter, sequence number
overflow, anti-replay window, AH/ESP information, lifetime of the SA, IPSec protocol
mode (i.e., tunnel or transport), and path MTU.
Each SMIB entry is defined by SA selectors which enables the mapping o f a
particular SA to IP traffic. The following selectors are used [8]: destination/source IP
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address, user ID, data sensitivity level, transport layer protocol, IPSec protocol (AH or
ESP or AH/ESP), source and destination ports, IPv6 class, IPv6 flow table, and IPv4 type
of service.
In addition to SA information, the SMIB may contain information such as control lists,
IDs for networked resources, and session keys [37].

4.5 - IPSec Functional Layers Summary
The proposed IPSec layered architecture is a highly configurable architecture with
the inherent flexibility needed to realize redundancy and adaptation needed for
atypical distributed computing scenario consisting of a collection of machines
connected by local or wide-area communication network.

Application level

processes communicate by using a communication subsystem that typically
consists of IP, some transport-level protocol such as TCP or UDP, and potentially,
some middle were- level protocols.

The designed IPSec system provides the

abstraction of a bidirectional point-to-point communication channel for each
connection that is opened. The design uses the established algorithms in the
security mechanism layer to provide security guarantees for the needed security
services layer. Each of these security services is associated with one or more
software modules that implement the corresponding security feature. The design
is configurable in the sense that specific modules can be selected based on user
and application requirements. First, it allows the user to determine which IPSec
property to use if a certain property is not required or if it is already implemented
by some other system layer, then no module that implements the property needs to
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be included. Second, it allows the user to select which mechanism (or module) to
use to implement a particular IPSec property. The user can evaluate the modules
by various metrics, including the relative level of security and resource utilization.
All modules are synthetically independent from one another by virtue of
the execution model supported by the IPSec processes, which means that any
combination is synthetically valid.

However, the different IPSec security

properties have certain semantic dependencies and ordering constraints that are
reflected as semantic dependencies and ordering constraints of intra-layers and
inter-layers. In practice, these dependencies are recorded as a configuration graph
that can be used to ensure any chosen IPSec configuration is semantically
consistent.
4.6 Location of IPSec Architecture
Within a LAN, IP traffic is typically nonsecure since all of the systems in the network are
part of the trusted network. IPSec operates in a networking device, such as a firewall or a
router, that connects the LAN to the outside world [8]. The proposed architecture can be
implemented on the networking device, or on a separate system that interfaces with the
networking device.
A typical IPSec setup is depicted in Figure 4.9 below. In the figure, there is a LAN and a
client system external to the LAN. Traffic within the LAN is nonsecure, but all traffic
between the client system and LAN is secured using IPSec protocols. In this setup, the
proposed architecture is implemented on its own system that interfaces with the network
router of the LAN, while the architecture is part of the client system.
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Figure 4.9: Location o f IPSec Architecture
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CHAPTER V: IPSec SCENARIOS
5.1 - IPSec SCENARIOS
5.1.1 Scenario 1 (An IPSec Session Scenario)
Let us assume a remote IPSec client system wants to establish an IPSec transport
connection to a remote server. The client chooses to use ESP encryption and
authentication. However, before ESP can be used keys need to be exchanged between the
client system and the remote server using ISAKMP.
It is assumed that the base ISAKMP message exchange type is used. Four messages
are exchanged between the client and server in this scenario; the first two establish an SA
between the two systems, and the second two exchange key information [43]. Also, it is
assumed that Diffe-Hellman is the key exchange algorithm used, and HMAC-MD5-96 is
used to authenticate messages where appropriate.
The following steps and Figure 5.1 illustrate how the first two messages that establish
theSA would be threaded throught the proposed architecture.

t - <<)«

OS
Figure 5.1: SA Negotiation

1. The client system determines the parameters for the SA between itself and the server.
The client system interfaces with the IPSec protocol handling function, and the dispatcher
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determines that ISAKMP will be used and passes the SA information to the ISAKMP
MPU.
2. The ISAKMP MPU sends the SA data to the SMIB.
3. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the random number generator in layer 1 to obtain a nonce
that is included in the initial ISAKMP message.
4. The message is passed on to the dispatcher for transmission to the remote server.
5. The client system receives a response (second message) from the server and passes it
on to the IPSec protocol handling function. The dispatcher determines the data is a
ISAKMP message and passes it on to the ISAKMP MPU.
6 . The MPU verifies that the parameters of the SA have been accepted; any changes are

written to the SMIB.
The third message is from the client to the server and contains the key exhange material
of the client. Creation of this message using the proposed architecture is explained in the
following steps and illustrated in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Third Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange
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1. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the confidentiality module in layer 3.
2. The confidentiality module invokes the Diffe-Hellman sub module of the key
management module of layer 3.
3. The Diffe-Hellman module invokes the prime number generation and the modular
arithmetic modules in layer 1 to choose a prime number and private key that is a
primitive root of the prime number.
4. The Diffe-Hellman module invokes the modular arithmetic module in layer 1 to
calculate the client's public key.
5. The ISAKMP MPU invokes the authentication module in layer 3.
6 . The authentication module invokes the HMAC sub module of the message

authentication module of layer 2 .
7. The HMAC module invokes the MD5 submodule of the one-way hash module o f layer
1 to calculate the authentication value over the message.
8 . The ISAKMP MPU passes the message that contains the public key and identity of the

client system and the authentication data to the dispatcher. The dispatcher passes the
message to the client system for transmission to the remote server.
The fourth message is from the server to the client. The client uses this message to obtain
the key information of the server to establish the session key. The processing of this
message using the proposed architecture is explained in the following steps and
illustrated in Figure 5.3.
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Figure 5.3: Fourth Message of the ISAKMP Base Exchange

1. The client system receives a response from the server and passes it on to the IPSec
protocol handling function. The dispatcher determines the data is a ISAKMP message
and passes it on to the ISAKMP MPU.
2. The MPU verifies the authentication data o f the message by invoking the
authentication module in layer 3.
3. The authentication module invokes the HMAC sub module of the message
authentication module in layer 2 .
4. The HMAC sub module invokes the MD5 sub module of the one-way hash module in
layer 1.
5. The MPU verifies that the calculated HMAC-MD-96 matches that contained in the
message. The MPU verifies the identity of the server by comparing the ID in the message
to that in the SMIB entry.
6 . The MPU retrieves the server public key from the message and invokes the

confidentiality module in layer 3.

103

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

7. The confidentiality module invokes the Diffe-Hellman sub module of the key
management module in layer 2 .
8 . The Diffe-Hellman submodule invokes the modular arithmetic module in layer 1 to

generate the secret key.
9. The secret key is stored in the SMIB; this key will be used as the session key to
encrypt all subsequent messages.
Now that a session key has been generated, ESP authentication and encryption can now
be applied using the proposed architecture. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.4 and
explained in the following steps.

m

Figure 5.4: IPSec Example

1. The client system interfaces with the IPSec protocol handling function. The dispatcher
determines the data will use ESP and passes the data onto the ESP MPU.
2. The ESP MPU invokes the confidentiality service in layer 3.
3. The IPSec confidentiality service in layer 3 invokes the symmetric encryption
mechanism in layer 2. The encryption is applied to the IP payload.
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4. Let us assume that the algorithm used for encryption is DES; thus the DES function in
the encryption fundamentals module in layer 1 is invoked. The key used for encryption is
retrieved from the SMIB.
5. The ESP MPU now invokes the authentication service in layer 3.
6 . The authentication service relies on the IPSec authentication mechanism in layer 2.

The HMAC module of the message authentication module is invoked.
7. Asssume HMAC-MD5-96 is used for authentication. The HMAC module in layer 2
calls the MD5 function of the one-way hash codes module in layer 1; the first 96 bits of
the HMAC value are taken as the authentication data.
8 . The authenticated and encrypted ESP message is passed on to the dispatcher which

then interfaces with the operating system to transmit the data over the connection.

5.1.2 Scenario 2
Two hosts, A and B, with IP address 1.1.1.1 and 2.2.2.2 have established two SAs,
SAi, SA2. (The SADB shown in the Figure 5.5 does not have all the fields. The
sequence number, lifetime, and other fields have been left out). SAi is configured for
ESP with 3DES and SA2 ESP with DES. This information is stored in the SPD.
SA] is used for very secure applications; such as banking, which runs on a TCP using
port 1000. After IPSec processing, if the policy is not checked to determine if the
banking application did in fact use 3DES, then security is compromised. The policy
can be checked only after the IPSec processing as the selectors are not available
before because they may be encrypted.
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Figure 5.5: Flow of specific IPSec SMIB.

5.1.3 Scenario 3
Let us consider the example network diagram shown in Figure 5.6 For outbound
processing, we will consider an HTTP packet (TCP, port 80) generated by host A
destined to host B (a Web server) traversing routers RA and RB. The policy on A for
packets destined to host B mandates using AH in transport mode using HMAC-MD5.
The policy on router RA mandates that all packets destined to the network 2.2.2/24 be
encrypted with ESP using 3DES and tunneled to RB.
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Figure 5.6: Example o f IPSec outbound processing.

5.2 - IPSec Deployment
In this section, we are going to illustrate how the security services can of designed
IPSec system be used to provide different IPSec solutions.

Packet

Security

Security

i
Gateway

Gateway
i
P e e r Authentication

P a c k e t Integrity

Data E ncryption

S e ss io n Re-Keying

Figure 5.7: Schematic o f A security Gateway
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5.2.1- Virtual Private Network (VPN)
How do we ensure the safe passage of data across a shared infrastructure?
The answer is to deploy a secured virtual private network (VPN), VPNs are
networks deployed on a public network infrastructure that utilize the same
security, management, and quality of service policies that are applied in a
private network. VPNs provide an alternative to building a private network for
site to site communication over a public network or the Internet. Because they
operate across a shared infrastructure rather than a private network, companies
can cost effectively extend the corporate WAN to telecommuters, mobile users,
and remote offices as well as to new constituencies, such as customers,
suppliers, and business partners. Figure 5.4 shows the schematic of IPSec VPN
configuration.
Branch

office

IF S sc VPN

IP S e c VPN

■
C u sto m er A
Internet

R em ote a c c e s s

a

iP/N lPIS network
Internet
u etew ay

IP S eo i

IPSoc VPN
IPSec VPN
C u sto m er B
T e leoom m uw /S O H O

Figure 5.8: Schematic o f IPSec VPN Configuration

Traditional private WANs connect customer sites via dedicated point to point links.
This means that multiple independent circuits have to terminate at the corporate
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network egress, making the deployment nonscalable and difficult to maintain. VPNs
extend the classic WAN by replacing the physical point to point links with logical
point to point links sharing a common infrastructure, allowing all the traffic to be
aggregated into a single physical connection. This scenario results in potential
bandwidth and cost savings at the network egress. Because customers no longer need
to maintain a private network, and because a VPN itself cheaper to own and offers
significant cost savings over private WANs, operation costs are reduced.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Conclusion
The IPSec protocol provides the security functionality for interconnecting end systems
across multiple networks. For this reason, IPSec is implemented in each end system and
in network gateways, which provide connection between network. The implementation of
IPSec should effectively support public key cryptography, open standards and interfaces,
and bring together an otherwise dispersed security services into an integrated solution
under a complete security management system.

In this thesis a framework for IPSec implementation architecture was developed. For our
purposes, the developed IPSec implementation provides a useful overview of many of the
concepts of network security that IPSec deals with, and it is flexible to allow for
enhancement and future modifications. The developed architecture treats each security
function as a “block box”. This has two benefits:

First, an existing implementation of a security “function” piece can be used as a
“module” in implementing IPSec. In this way, the bulk of the IPSec required software
code is prepackaged and ready to use with no or slight modification. Second, if it is ever
desired to replace a given functionality in an IPSec implementation all that is required is
to remove the existing “function module” and drop in the new module. This could be
done if a new more efficient “function piece” were desired. More important, if the
security of one of the embedded function pieces were compromised, the security of the
overall IPSec implementation could be retained simply by replacing the affected
embedded function piece with a more secure one.
The proposed IPSec functional architecture is useful to network security engineers as a
way of managing and administering the task of provisioning the network IPSec
requirements. Furthermore, because the development is a systematic way of structuring
the IPSec functionality and standards, computer and communication vendors can benefit
from it by developing products that related to this structured implementation of IPSec
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services and mechanisms. The IPSec services and the applications it supports are
implemented as a collection of discrete modules. A certain set of modules may be
developed by a particular vendor, while a different set of modules may be developed by
another vendor. In addition, the modular structure of the implementation architecture
lends itself to defining different version of each module. This in turn makes it possible to:
1) define alternative or enhanced capabilities for certain aspects of IPSec
without needing to go to a new version of the entire standard (e.g., IPv 6
security), and
2 ) clearly specify coexistence and transition strategies.

6.2 Concluding Rem arks
The realization approaches outlined for the IPSec functions in this thesis can
provide customizable communication security by allowing the user to choose which
security attributes are required for a connection and which algorithms are used to
implement these attributes.
The proposed IPSec functional architecture can provide a highly configurable
secure communication service with the inherent flexibility needed to realize redundancy
and adaptation needed for a typical distributed computing environment consisting of a
collection of machines connected by a local or wide-area communication network[49].

6.3 Future W ork
Future work shall include the development of a lab-grade prototype. Experimentation
with the prototype and the development of a family of secure communication scenarios
with different execution characteristics are to be performed. A special focus should be
developing modules that are scalable and that minimize the synchronization required to
support coordinated execution behavior. Performance analysis experiments should be
preformed.
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Appendices

Appendix A1

o

IPv4 Datagrams Format

An IP datagram consists of a header portion and a data portion. The header
portion consists of a 20 bytes fixed part and a variable length optional part. The
data portion is of variable length. Figure A .l shows the format of an IPv4
datagram.
32-bits
|12

16

4 - bits 4 - bits
8-bits type of service
version
IHL
1 6 - bits identifl cation
8-bitstimetolive

|20

124

128

31

16-bitstotal length
3 -bits
flags

8 - bits protocol

13 - bits fragments offset
16 -b its checksum

32 - bits source address
32 -b its destination address
Option (0 or more words length)

i

Data (variable length)

Figure A.l: IPv4 datagram.

An IP datagram is transmitted in big endian byte order: from left to right, that is,
lower order bytes are transmitted first. This is the byte ordering required for all
binary integers in the TCP/IP headers as they traverse a network. This is called

116

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

network byte order. Machines such as Pentiums, which uses little endian byte
ordering format must convert header values to network byte order before
transmitting the data.
- The version field indicates the version of the IP protocol that the data belongs.
This field is usually use for backward compatibility.
- The EHL field is the length of the header in 32-bits words. The minimum value
is 5 words(20 bytes) which is the case when no options are present: and the
maximum value is 15 words (60 bytes) which applies when the options field is 40
bytes.
- The type of service (TOS) field indicates the traffic requirement of the
datagram in bytes. The maximum length is 65,535 bytes. This field is used in
combination with the IHL field to indicate where the data portion of the IP
datagram begins.
- The identification field allows a host to determine which datagram that a newly
arrived fragment belongs to. Each datagram has a unique identification number,
and each fragment of a datagram has the same identification number.
- Only 2 of the 3 bits flags are used. The first of the two bits is called the DF
(don’t fragment) bit: it indicates whether or not the IP datagram should be
fragmented. If this bit is set, it indicates that the datagram should not be
fragmented. When a router receives a datagram with DF bit set, it usually sends
back an ICMP message to the host from which the datagram originated indicating
its MTU (Maximum Transfer Unit). This bit is therefore used to determine path
- MTU (path Maximum Transfer Unit): the maximum size of an IP datagram
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that will be allowed to pass through a given network path on route to the
destination without been subjected to fragmentation.
- The next bit is called MF (more fragment) bit. This bit indicates when the last
fragment of a datagram arrives. This bit is set for all of the fragments of a
datagram except the last fragment.
The fragment offset tells where in the current datagram this fragment belongs. All
fragments except the last one in a datagram must be a multiple of 8 bytes.
- The time to live (TTL) field is used to limit the life time of a datagram, thus
preventing datagram from looping infinitely within a network segment. The TTL
field is set to a default value by the host. Each router that the datagram passes
through, decrements the TTL value by one. If a router receives a datagram with a
TT1 value of 1, it discards the datagram and sends an ICMP message to the source
indicating that the TTL value of the datagram has expired.
- The protocol field tells which transport protocol is used for the data
encapsulated within the IP datagram. It allows destination hosts to demultiplex IP
datagrams among the different transport protocols.
- The header checksum is computed on the IP header and is used to determine
the integrity of the IP header. It should be noted that the checksum is not
encrypted and it can easily be forged.
- The source and destination address fields indicate the 4 bytes IP address of
the host that generated the datagram, and the destination host respectively.

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

- The variable length options field carries optional information about a datagram
such as the security and handling restriction. This field is rarely used and is
usually ignored by most routers.
- The data portion of the IP datagram is of variable length and it contains the
IP payload. For further detail regarding the format of the data or header portion of
an IPv4 datagram refer to [30] which contains the official specification o f IPv4
protocol.
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o IPv6 Datagram Format
IPv4 suffers from a major limitation :it limits IP address to 32 bits. With the current
rate of growth of the Internet, there is a real possibility that if the size of IP addresses
does not increase, then there might not be enough IP addresses to meet the demand.
The designated successor of IPv4: IPv6 overcomes this limitation as well as
simplifies the IP header and adds more flexibility to the IP datagram. Some of the
changes from IPv4 to IPv6 are outlined below.
-

IPv 6 increases the IP address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, thus increasing the

addressable nodes by many folds.
-

The number of header fields is reduced from 13 in IPv4 to 7 in IPv6 . The smaller

number of headers allows routers to process packets faster and therefore, increases
throughput.
-

IPv6 provides better support for options. The options are treated as separate

headers instead of being a part to the IP header. This change allows routers to skip
over headers that are not intended for them. This feature speeds up packet processing
time; it also allows for less stringent limits on the length of options and provides
greater flexibility for the introduction of new options in the future.
-

IPv6 provides new capability to label packets belonging to particular traffic

stream for which the sender requests special handling, such as non default quality of
service.
-

IPv6 does not support any fragmentation for packets in transit. The host that

generates the packet must perform path MTU to ascertain the maximum size of the IP
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datagram that will be allowed to pass through the network segment on route to the
destination host.
-

IPv6 specified extension to support authentication, data integrity and(optional)

data confidentiality.
Figure A. 1.2 shows the required IPv6 fixed headers.
32-NM
B
4 -b its
y erslo *

112_______ M®________g?_______ 124_______ 128

4-blts
Priori*

311

24-bfts flow label

16-bits payload length

8-blts next header S-bits hop limit

128-bits source address

128-bits d estaa tio u address

Figure A.1.2: IPv6 Header Format.

- The version field is similar to IPv4 version field. The priority field is used to
indicate the quality of service that a packet requires. The flow label field is still
experimental, but is likely that it will be used in the future to set up a pseudo
connection with particular properties and requirements [31].
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- The payload length is a 16 bit unsigned integer which indicates the length of the IP
payload, that is, the rest of the packet following the IPv6 headers.
- The next header field identifies the type of header immediately following the IPv 6
header. This field facilitates the reduction in the number of fields in the IPv6 header
compared to that of IPv4. It tells which extension header, if any, follows this one; if
this header is the last IP header, it tells which transport protocol the packet should be
passed to. For information on the number assigned to each protocol see [33]
- The hop limit field is the same as the TTL field in IPv4.
The source and destination address fields represent the 128-bits IPv6 addresses of the
source and intended recipient of the packet, respectively.

o Extension Headers
IPv6 introduced the concept of optional extension headers. These headers can be
supplied to provide additional information. There are currently 6 extension headers
defined by IPv6 , and each has a unique identification number (described in [33]).
The extension headers, if present, are inserted between the IPv6 header and the
transport header. If more than one extension header is present, the order of the
headers is important and should be as detailed in [32] (the original specification of
IPv6 ).
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Appendix A2

Fields for the SA:
-

Sequence Number
“ This is a 32-bit number that is incremented by 1 every time SA is used to secure
the communication” [5]. It is used by both parties for outbound processing and it
is contained in the AH and ESP headers.

-

Sequence Number Overflow
“ This field is set when the sequence number overflows” [5]. It is used by both
parties to process outbound traffic. Once the overflow is occurred, IPSec policy
decides whether the current SA can still be used for additional communication or
a new SA should be established.

-

Anti-replay Window
This field is used in inbound processing to control an important issue in
networking which is replay attacks. IPSec defeats these attacks by detecting
packets replayed by malicious hosts.

-

Lifetime
Each SA has a lifetime associated with it that indicates when it can not be used
any more. This lifetime is specified either in terms of number of bytes that have
been secured using this SA, or the duration for which the SA has been used, or
both.
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-

Mode
This field identifies the mode of IPSec protocols which can be either a tunnel
mode or transport mode. Table 2.1 shows an SA with example values.

Security Association Parameters

Example Values

SPI

3219011

IP Destination Address

172.16.16.10

AH Mode

Transport

AH Algorithm

SHA-1

AH Key

196 bit SHA-1 Key length

ESP Mode

Transport

ESP Algorithm

3DES

ESP key

168 bit 3DES key length

ESP Authentication Algorithm

MD5

ESP Authentication Algorithm Key

96 bit MD5 key length

Life time

3600 sec

Table A2.1: Example o f SA
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Appendix A3

The objects stored in Security Database:
1) Security Policy Database
The IPSec protocol mandates that the Security Policy Database (SPDB) must be
consulted during the processing of all traffic, whether the traffic is inbound or
outbound. The SPDB contains an order list of policy entries. Each entry is specified
by the use of one or more selectors. The selectors the IPSec currently allows are:
o Destination IP address: The destination IP address can be a 32-bit IPv4
or a 128-bit IPv6 address. The address can be a host IP address, a
broadcast, unicast, anycast, a multicast group, a range of addresses,
address plus netmask or wild card address. The destination IP address is
obtained from the destination IP address field of the Authentication
Header (AH) or the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header (s) or if
IPSec is not applied to the packet the IP header,
o

Source IP address: The source IP address can be a 32-bit IPv4 or a 128bit IPv6 address. The address can be a host IP address, a broadcast,
unicast, anycast, a multicast group, a range of addresses, address plus
netmask or wild card address. The destination IP address is obtained from
the source IP address field of the AH or the ESP header(s) or if IPSec is
not applied to the packet the IP header.
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o

Transport layer protocol: Ther transport layer protocol is obtained from
the IPv4”protocol” or the IPv6”next header” fields,

o

System name: The system name can be a fully qualified DNS name such
as eep.mega.uwindsor.ca, a X.500 distinguished name or a X.500 general
name.

o Use ID: The user ID can be a fully qualified DNS user name such as
fah 1@ece.uwindsor.ca or a X.500 distinguished name.

2) Security Association Database
The Security Association Database (SADB) contains the active Security Association
(SA) entries. Each SA entry is indexed by a triplet consisting of a Security Parameter
Index (SPI), a source or destination IP address and a IPSec protocol. In addition, a
SADB entiy consists of the following fields:
o

Sequence Number Counter: This is a 32-bit integer which is used to
generate the sequence number field in AH or ESP headers,

o

Sequence Counter Overflow: This is a flag indicating whether the
overflow of the Sequence Number Counter should be audited and the
transmission of additional traffic be blocked for the given SA.

o Anti- Replay Window: A 32-bit counter and a bit-map that is used to
ascertain whether an inbound AH or ESP packet is replay,
o AH authentication algorithms and required keys,
o ESP Authentication algorithms and required keys,
o ESP encryption algorithms, keys, Initial Vector(IV) and IV mode.
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o IPSec protocol mode: This field indicates which IPSec protocol mode
(transport, tunnel or wild card) is applied to AH and ESP traffic,
o Path Maximum Transfer Unit (PMTU): Any observed PMTU and
aging variables.
o Lifetime of the SA: This field contains the time interval within which a
SA must be replaced by a new SA or be terminated, plus an indication of
whether the SA should be replaced or terminated when it expires. The
lifetime of a SA takes two forms: a time interval or byte count which
represents the number of bytes that IPSec protocols has been applied to the
parameter that expires first takes precedence.
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Appendix A4

o ISAKMP Header Format
ISAKMP message consist of a fixed length header followed by a variable number o f
payloads. The fixed-length header contains the necessary information for the protocol
to maintain state and process the payloads. The ISAKMP header format is illustrated
in Figure 3.16.
31

23

15

I

Initiator Cookie

Responder Cookie
Next Payload

Major Minor
Version Version Exchange Type

Flags

Message IP
Message Length

Figure A.4.1: The ISKAMP Header Format

A description of the ISAKMP header fields follows.
-

Initiator Cookie: This field contains a unique 8 -bit integer that the initiator of the
ISAKMP exchanges generates. This cookie is created by each peer and are used, along
with the message ID, to identify the state that defines an ISAKMP exchange in progress.
The

method

of generating

the

cookies

varies

with

different

implementations of ISAKMP; however, the protocol specifies that the
cookies, whether that of the initiator or responder, should be generated
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using secret information that is unique to the respective ISAKMP
communicating hosts, and it should not be possible to determine the secret
information from the cookie. In addition the cookie for each SA should be
unique. A possible method of generating cookies is to perform a hash
(using MD5 or SHA-1 hash function) of the concatenation of the source
and destination address, UDP source and destination ports, a locally
generated secret random number and the current date and time.
Responder Cookie: This field contains the responder’s 8-bit cookie. The
attributes of this cookie are similar to that of the initiator’s.
Next Payload: This is a 8-bit field that indicates the first payload in the message;
it also indicates which of the various ISAKMP payloads immediately follows the
header. Table A.4.1 shows the payload that ISAKMP currently defines.
Next Payload Type
NONE
Security Association
Proposal
Transform
Key Exchange
Identification
Certificate
Certificate Request
Hash
Signature
Nonce
Notification
Delete
Vendor
RESERVED
Private USE

Assigned Value
0
1
2

3
4
5
6

7
8

9
10
11
12

13
14-127
128-255

Table A.4.1: Assigned Values for ISAKMP Payloads.
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-

M ajor Version: This 4-bit field indicates the major version of the ISAKMP
Protocol in use. The specification for ISAKMP specifies that an ISAKMP
implementation should not accept packets with a Major or Minor Version that is
larger than its own.

-

M inor Version: This 4-bit field contains the protocol Minor Version number.

-

Exchange Type: This 8 -bit field indicates the type of exchange that the message
comprises of. Table 3.2 shows the exchange types that ISAKMP currently
defines.
Exchange Type
NONE
Base
Identity Protection
Authentication Only
Aggressive
Informational
ISAKMP Future Use
DOI Specific Use
Private Use

Assigned Value
0
1
2

3
4
5
6-3 1
32-239
240-255

Table A.4.2: ISAKMP Exchange Type and Assigned Values

-

Flags: This 8-bit field indicates specific options that are set for ISAKMP
exchanges. The first 3 bits of this field are currently used, the others are set to
zero before transmission.
■ E(Encryption Bit): which signifies that the payloads following the
header are encrypted.
■ C(Commit Bit): which signifies that a peer wishes a notification of
exchange completion.
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■ A(Authentication-only Bit): used primarily by those who wish to
add key recovery to ISAKMP.

-

Message ID: This is a 4-byte field which contains a random value generated by
the initiator of phase 2 (which will be discussed later in this chapter) negotiation.
It serves as a unique Message Identifier that is used to identify the protocol state
during phase 2 negotiations.

-

Message Length: This is a 4-byte field which indicates the length of the total
message (header + payloads) in bytes.

o ISAKMP Payloads Formats
Generic Payload Header
Each ISAKMP payload begins with a generic header. The Generic Payload
Header clearly defines the boundaries of the payload and consequently allows the
chaining of different payloads. Figure A.4.2 illustrates the Generic Payloads
Header.

0
Next
Payload

23
I

15

7

31

Payload Length

RESERVED

Figure A.4.2: Generic Payload Header Format

A description of the Generic Payload Header fields follows.
-

Next Pavload: This 8-bit field identifies the payload type that follows this
payload. If the current payload is the last payload of the message, the Next
Payload field will be set to 0.
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-

RESERVED : This field is unused and it is set to 0.

-

Payload Length: Contains the length in bytes of the current payload including
the Generic Payload Header. This is a 2-byte field.

We will now discuss the ISAKMP payloads that IKE uses.
2) Security Association Payload
The Security Association Payload is used to negotiate SA and to indicate the
Domain of Interpretation (DOI) under which the negotiation takes place. Figure
A.4.3 illustrates the format of this payload.

0

r

Is!ext
Payload

1

5

RESERVED

23
I
Payload Length

31

Domain of Interpretation (DOI)
Situation

Figure A.4.3: Security Association Payload Format.

The “Next Payload”, “ RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to
those of Generic Payload Header fields.
-

Domain of Interpretation (POD: This 4-byte field contains a 4-byte unsigned
integer which identifies the DOI under which the negotiation is taking place. A
DOI defines payload formats, exchange types and convention for naming relevant
information such as cryptographic algorithms, modes, etc.

-

Situation: This variable length field identifies the Situation under which the
negotiation is taking place. A Situation is the set of information that will be used
to determine the required security service.
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3) Proposal Payload
The Proposal Payload contains information used during the SA negotiation. This
payload provides the framework for the initiator of the ISAKMP exchange to
present to the recipient the preferred security protocol(s) and associated security
mechanisms desired for the SA being negotiated. The Proposal Payload is
illustrated in Figure A.4.4.

0

15

r

Next
Payload
Proposal
Number

RESERVED
Protocol- ID

23

31

I

Payload

SPI Size

Length
Number of
Transforms

Variable- length SPI

/
]

Figure A.4.4: Proposal Payload Format

A description of the Proposal Payload fields follows. The “Next Payload”
RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to those described in the
payloads that we discussed previously.
-

Proposal Number: This 8-bit field contains the identification number of the
proposal for the current payload. The Proposal Number allows the peers that are
involved in the SA establishment negotiation to present preferences to its
communication peers in the form of logical AND or OR operations. For example,
if the initiator of the exchange wishes to inform the other peer that it desires a
combined protection suite consisting of ESP encryption with Triple-DES and
authentication with HMAC-SHA-1, and AH authentication with HMAC-MD5, it
would send a message that contains three Proposal Payloads, each with the same
Proposal Number. If however, the peer needs to transmit the information that it
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requires either ESP authentication with HMAC-MD5 or AH authentication with
HMAC-SHA-1, it would send a message consisting of two Proposal Payloads,
each with monotonically increasing Proposal Number. The Proposal Number here
indicates the order of preference of the proposals: The greater the preference, the
smaller the proposal number.
-

Protocol- ID : This 8-bit field contains the protocol identifier (example 50 for
ESP and 51 for AH).

-

SPI Size: Contains the length in bytes of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of
the protocol specified by the Protocol-ID field. If the protocol is ISAKMP, the
SPI is the initiator-responder cookie pair. This field is a 8-bit field.

-

Number of T ransform : This 8-bit field gives the number of Transforms for the
proposal. Each of the transforms specified is embodied in a Transform Payload.

-

SPI: This variable-length field contains the source node SPI.

4) Transform Payload
The Transform Payload provides the framework for the initiating peer to present
different security mechanisms for a given protocol during the negotiation to
establish a SA. The proposal payload identifies a protocol for which services are
being negotiated. The Transform Payload allows the initiating peer to present the
supported transform or mode of operation of the proposed protocol. Figure A.4.5
illustrates the format of the Transform Payload.
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Figure A.4.5: Transform Payload Format

A description of the Transform Payload fields follows.
-

Next Payload: The 8 -bit Next Payload field identifies the payload type that
follows the current payload. This field will either contains the value 3 or 0. If
another Transform Payload follows the current Transform Payload, the value in
this field will be 3; if however the current Transform Payload is the last one for
the proposed protocol, the value in this field will be 0 .

-

Reserved: Similar to the “RESERVED” field in the payloads previously
discussed.

-

Payload Length: Similar to the “Payload Length” field in the payloads
previously discussed.

-

Transform num ber: This 8-bit field identifies the Transform Number for the
current payload. If there are more than one transform for the proposed protocol,
each transform will be embodied in a Transform Payload and each transform is
identified b y a m onotonically increasing num ber. T he transform s are ord ered

according to the initiating peer’s preference: the most desired transform has the
lowest Transform Number.
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-

Transform -ID; This 8-bit field specifies the transform identifier for the proposed
protocol.

-

Reserved2; This 16-bit field is unused and is set to 0.

-

SA Attributes: This variable-length field contains the Security Association
attributes for the Transform specified by the Transform-ID field.

5) Key Exchange Payload
The key Exchange Payload supports various key exchange protocols.
Figure A.4.6 illustrates the key Payload.

15

Pay! oact

RESERVED

23
Payload Length

Key Exchange D ata

Figure A.4.6: Key Exchange Payload Format

The “Next payload”, “ RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to
those of the payload previously discussed. The key Exchange Data field is of
variable length and it contains the data required to generate a session key. The
DOI for the respective key exchange specifies the format and the interpretation of
the data in this field.

6) Identification Payload
The Identification Payload allows communicating peers to exchange identity
information. Figure A.4.7 illustrates the format of this payload.
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Figure A.4.7: Identification Payload Format.

The “Next Payload”, “RESERVED” and “Payload Length” fields are similar to
those of the payload previously discussed.
-

ID Type: This 8-bit field contains the type of identification being used, and it
depends on the DOI of the respective key exchange.

-

DOI Specific II) D ata: This 24-bit field contains DOI specific identification data.

-

Identification D ata: This variable-length field contains identification information
specified by the DOI of the key exchange. The ID Type field specifies the format
of the information in this field.

7) Certificate Payload
The Certificate Payload allows communicating peers to exchange certificate or
certificate-related material. Figure A.4.8 illustrates the format of this payload.
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31

Payload Length

Certificate Data

i

7

Figure A.4.8: Certificate Payload Format
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The “ Next Payload”, “ RESERVED” and “ Payload Length” fields are again,
similar to those of the payload previously discussed.
-

Certificate Encoding: This 8-bit field identifies the kind of certificate or
certificate-related information the “ Certificate Data” field contains.

-

Certificate D ata: This variable-length field contains the actual certificate data for
the certificate type specified in the “Certificate Encoding” field.

8) Hash Payload
The Hash Payload contains the data generated by the hash function selected during
the SA negotiation. Figure A.4.9 illustrates the format of this payload.
0

7

Next
Payload

15

RESERVED

23

1
Payload Length

31

Hash Data

Figure A.4.9: Hash Payload Format

The “Hash Data” field contains the message digest that resulted from the
application of the hash function to the input data.

9) Signature Payload
The Signature Payload contains the data generated by the signature function
negotiated for the SA: and it is used to verify the integrity of the data in an
ISAKMP message. The format of this payload is illustrated in figure A.4.10
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Figure A.4.10: Signature Payload Format

The “Signature Data “field is of variable length and it contains the signature data
that resulted from the signing of the ISAKMP message using the digital signature
algorithm negotiated for the SA.

10) Nonce Payload
The Nonce payload contains some pseudo - random information necessary used to
protect the exchange data against replay. Figure A.4.11 illustrates this payload.

23
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31
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Figure A.4.11: Nonce Payload Format

The variable- length Nonce Data” field contains the random data generated by the
communicating peer that is sending the message.
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A p p en d ix B
Preshared Keys Overview and Types
The same preshared key is configured on each IPSec peer. The preshared key is
combined with the Diffie- Heilman key, initiator, and responder’s nonce and cookie (this
is an 8-byte pseudorandom number unique to each peer and the particular exchange in
which it is defined) to form the authentication key. The authentication key is combined
with device-specific information and sent through a hash algorithm to obtain HASH_I
(initiator’s hash value) and HASH_R (responder’s hash value). IKE peers authenticate
each other by exchanging and decoding H A S H I and HASHR. If the receiving peer is
able to independently recreate the same hash, the peer is authenticated. Each local peer
must authenticate its remote peer before the tunnel is considered secure.
The preshared key is used during IKE (ISAKMP) phase 1 (main mode) to authenticate
the Diffie-Hellman (D-H) shared secret exchange. There are three types of preshared
keys: unique, group, and wildcard. Unique preshared keys are fixed to a specific IP
address. They are defined for paris of peers when the IP addresses of the peers are known
initially. Group preshared keys are tied to a group name identity; these are applicable
only to remote access. Wildcard preshared keys are not coupled with any unique
information to determine a peer’s identity. They are valid with any other device, as long
as that device is also defined to use the same key value. Any devices that have the key
will authenticated successfully. When using wildcard preshared keys, every device in the
network uses the same key. If a single device in your network is compromised and the
wildcard preshared key has been gathered, then all devices are compromised. Readers are

140

R eproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

strongly advised to avoid deploying wildcard preshared keys for site-to-site device
authentication.
Preshared keys are simple to implement if your secured network is small (fewer than
ten nodes). However, they do not scale well with a large or growing network. Depending
on how strong the preshared keys are and how often they are replaced, they may not
provide strong device authentication. In fact, preshared key is the least secure of the three
different authentication methods.
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